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Introduction 
The Lebanese civil war is one of the most complex and convoluted events of the 
twentieth century. Taking place between 1975 and 1990, the war drew in a multitude of 
countries and factions, to this day remaining the single event through which the 
subsequent history of Lebanon is framed. While no single conclusive narrative of the war 
has been agreed upon, the collective memory of modern Lebanese society often attributes 
its start to the actions of Palestinian refugees. There is a strong consensus in Lebanon that 
Palestinians are to blame for the civil war. They have emerged from it "weakened and 
hated" by much of the population, a development that has carried severe consequences 
for their post-war presence.' In this paper, I argue that the deplorable living conditions of 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon after 1990 are a direct consequence of their use as 
scapegoats for the civil war. Their very presence as Sunni Muslims is a challenge to the 
sectarian government system dominated by Maronite Christians. By utilizing the 
collective memory of blame, the government justified a troubling series of laws and 
regulations intended to prevent the naturalization of refugees. 
But the role of Palestinians in Lebanon is not limited to that of the oppressed 
victim. Their presence in the country through the civil war would become central to the 
evolution of the Lebanese state. In the years following the war, popular perception of 
refugees changed with the passage of time. The political leadership of central religious 
factions in the country, first Maronite Christians, followed by Sunni Muslims, Shiite 
Muslims, and the Druze, gradually came out against the acquisition of human and civil 
1 Michael C. Hudson, "The Palestinian Factor in the Lebanese Civil War," Middle East Journal 32 (1978): 
261. 
rights by Palestinians. The refugee presence provided a common enemy that sewed as a 
crucial unifying factor in postwar Lebanon. 
Disparity between historical accounts is a well documented phenomenon. In 
Silencing the Past, historian Michel-Rolph Trouillot claims "Something is always left out 
while something else is recorded.. .Thus whatever becomes fact does so within its own 
inborn absences, specific to its production."2 The case of Lebanon and the civil war is of 
particular interest, as the collective national narrative largely ignores what historical work 
does exist. Despite a strong body of scholarship that suggests otherwise, dominant 
Lebanese society in the postwar period persists in blaming the refugee population for the 
civil war. 
I first challenge the memory of Palestinians as violent instigators by contending 
that the war was primarily the result of internal sectarian tensions inherent to a fragile and 
unsustainable political system. The positive correlation between civil strife and the 
presence of any refugee population is well documented in a 2006 study by Idean 
Salehyan and Kristian ~leditsch.' But the newly created post-colonial state was riddled 
with division, ready for sectarian violence regardless of the Palestinian presence. While 
the refugee population in Lebanon certainly had an impact on the stability of the country, 
it does not account for the sectarian tensions and divides that preceded them. I then 
examine the contrast in how refugees were both perceived and treated before and after the 
war. The transformation of refugees in the collective public memory from the role of 
victim to that of instigator forms the base justification for their mistreatment in postwar 
Lebanon. 
2 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 49. 
ldean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War," International 
Organization 60 (2006): 356,361. 
Towards Civil War 
In this chapter I examine the role of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon on the start of the 
Lebanese civil war in 1975, and question the extent to which the accusations of blame are 
justified. I argue that, contrary to common belief, Palestinians in Lebanon were not the 
direct cause of the war, but rather one additional element in a volatile situation that led up 
to the outbreak of violence. There are two areas in which Palestinians in Lebanon 
contributed to the start of the civil war. First, their presence as primarily Sunni Muslims 
in a sectarian political landscape worked to deepen the existing internal divisions in a 
Lebanese society that equated religion with political allegiance. Second, discriminatory 
treatment and legal restrictions in response to this threat pushed them to militarize. But 
these arguments alone are not proportionate to the level of blame and reprisal that 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have born in wake of the civil war. Alone, they do not 
account for the start of the war. 
In order to accurately judge the impact of the Palestinian presence, it is essential 
to examine their actions within the context of Lebanese history and politics. Palestinians 
entered the country in 1948, just two years after it gained independence from the 
occupying colonial French mandate. Lebanon was politically unstable, haunted by deep 
internal divisions, and not equipped to play host to a large number of refugees. While the 
actions of some Palestinians may have played a role in escalating the situation, it was 
primarily the threat of their very presence to an already explosive political system that 
contributed to the outbreak of war. 
To support this argument, I will first lay out the historical context by examining 
the delicate sectarian political landscape that Palestinian refugees fled to in Lebanon. 
Dominant Lebanese society, namely Maronite Christians, treated the refugees as an 
undesirable immigrant population and a demographic threat to continued Maronite 
political control. They ensured that Palestinians were discriminated against from the 
moment of their arrival. These initial attitudes and policies of the greater Lebanese 
population had a strong negative effect on the position of refugees in the country and 
contributed heavily to the deterioration of the situation. 
I will first examine the history of Lebanon as a French mandate, highlighting the 
creation of a fragile sectarian state, where power sharing among eighteen religious 
factions is instrumental to the stability of the political system. I will then analyze the 
impact of inserting hundreds of thousands of predominantly Sunni Muslim refugees into 
this delicate balance. I argue that this event in and of itself had more of an impact on the 
situation than the actions of the refugees themselves. While Palestinians in Lebanon were 
certainly militarily active in the buildup to civil war, this took place within the framework 
of an unsustainable system of governance, constantly on the brink of collapse. Palestinian 
provocation was certainly detrimental to the political stability of the country, but was 
primarily a reaction to their categorization and treatment as a threat within that system. 
Early History 
While the area of Mount Lebanon existed within the Ottoman Empire, the 
territory that would become present day Lebanon did not exist as a single recognized 
entity until 1920. Those geographic borders, and thus the demographic makeup of the 
country, are a result of French colonial ambitions in the region. With the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire after the First World War, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 
designated Lebanon one of the newly created French mandates under direct French 
administration. As documented in Fawwaz Traboulsi's A History of Modern Lebanon, in 
laying out the permanent 1920 borders of the mandate, France exceeded the territory of 
predominantly Christian Mount Lebanon to include a number of Muslim coastal regions 
previously connected with Syria. French motivations for this gerrymandering included 
easier control over a crippled Syria, and the erosion of the Maronite Christian majority in 
Lebanon. The loss of that majority tied the protection of Maronite interests to continued 
French presence and support.4 The forced changes to the demographic makeup of 
Lebanon at a time when the territory was most unstable created a religious standoff that 
would shape the country for decades to come. 
Lebanon was marked by instability and strife from the very beginning of the 
mandate, long before the presence of Palestinian refugees. As Meir Zamir demonstrates 
in Lebanon 's Quest , while Maronites looked west towards ~rance,  a number of Muslims, 
angered by the division of Syria, called with increasing fervor for a reunification with the 
Arab world. They contended that France had produced a Maronite dominated state in 
order to both weaken Arab unity and as the result of a favored Maronite-French 
relationship. As part of the ruling majority under the Ottoman Empire, they were not 
willing to be marginalized under a Christian elite. In Syria, the loss of economically 
valuable coastal territory drew support for this position from the population and local 
leadership.5 
By 1925, an Arab Nationalist uprising in the Syrian and Lebanese mandates had 
claimed over 8,000 lives, a stark testament to early divisions and the importance 
4 Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon (Ann Arbor: Pluto, 2007), 75. 
Ibid, 81. 
attributed to religious dominance. At this stage, the fighting was directed toward French 
colonial forces and not yet inter-sectarian. But while the violence would soon subside, the 
contentious topic of religious dominance would remain a hallmark of the Lebanese 
political scene. Almost twenty years before independence, long before the arrival of 
Palestinians, elements of the population in Lebanon already saw sectarian issues as a 
legitimate pretext for violence. 
The political system in the country revolves around eighteen officially 
recognized religious sects, which are frequently at odds with one another. The number of 
parliamentary seats held by each sect was determined proportionally using the Lebanese 
national census of 1932, the last national census taken in Lebanon. According to Julie 
Peteet, author of Landscape of Hope and Despair, this system was originally agreed upon 
to facilitate stability, but essentially created internal divisions that would plague the 
country continuously. It is primarily the four largest factions that are relevant to the 
reception of Palestinians in Lebanon. Maronite Christians are the dominant sect in the 
country. They control the presidency and much of the wealth. Sunni Muslims were the 
second largest sect, and have controlled the seat of prime minister since the power 
sharing National Pact of 1943. The majority of Palestinian refugees are Sunni Muslim. 
Shiite Muslims were the third largest sect, and are widely regarded as poor rural farmers. 
They are primarily based in South Lebanon alongside most of the refugee camps, and 
were thus most strongly affected by that presence. The fourth sect of greatest relevance 
is the Druze community, a "near-mystic" early offshoot of Shiite 1slam.' While their 
leaders represented a comparatively small population, and did not hold as powerful a 
6 Meir Zamir, Lebanon's Quest (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 37. 
7 Julie Peteet, Landscape of Hope and Despair (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 6. 
8 Helena Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon (Bolder: Westview Press, 1985), 21. 
political position, as historian Helena Cobban points out, the militarily powerful sect 
played a vital role in the formation of the Lebanese system of government.9 It is 
important to note that despite the importance of sectarianism in Lebanon, each sect was 
not free from internal division, nor were inter-sectarian alliances fixed.'' 
By 1926, Lebanon had developed a constitution under French supervision. The 
document formally outlined the religious power sharing system known as 
confessionalism that would prove to be so problematic later on. It is of particular interest 
that the constitution itself recognizes the shortcomings of such an arrangement, framing it 
as a temporary system to be eventually replaced with a non-sectarian form of 
government. The development of a constitution should not be automatically interpreted as 
an indicator of increasing stability. In fact, scholars of Lebanese history such as Zamir, 
contend that it demonstrated just the opposite. Six years after it was approved, France 
suspended the constitution and resumed direct control over the mandate, doing so again 
during the Second World ware1 In that way, the constitution serves only to reinforce the 
extent of continued instability, French interference, and internal strife. 
French backed Maronite dominance was one of the central causal factors behind 
instability in Lebanon. This pattern of Maronite control is well illustrated in the 1929 
education reforms, where Prime Minister Emile Eddk closed 100 state schools he deemed 
unproductive, with disproportionate implications for the Muslim population. The vast 
majority of Muslim families sent children to (inferior) public schools in an effort to keep 
them away from Christian Missionary orders. The closure was clearly political, 
transcending the educational sphere to sabotage non-Christian opportunities. It sparked 
Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon, 2 1. 
10 Zamir, Lebanon 's Quest, 3.  
" Ibid 28. 
an outcry that succeeded in removing Maronite Prime Minsiter Eddk from political 
office.12 The development of the Lebanese political system was neither smooth nor 
harmonious, and animosity between Christians and Muslims is still clearly present at that 
stage. 
The national census of 1932 was in important political landmark that both 
exacerbated and cemented sectarian instability in the country. At a time when the 
requirements for citizenship where not yet hl ly defined, the inclusion of recent 
immigrants in the census shaped the way in which demographics would be remembered 
from that point onwards. A full 35% of the Christian population were recent immigrants 
as opposed to 9% of the non-Christian population.'3 Their inclusion served to legitimate 
the demographic dominance of Christians in Lebanon. The 1932 national census is the 
only one carried out in Lebanon to date, and would become the tool used in determining 
parliamentary political representation proportional to sect. Because those proportions 
would never be updated, the census will form a basis for controversy over political 
representation. 
By 1936, under growing public pressure, Lebanon and France started working on 
the lengthy process towards Lebanese independence. Maronites sought to solidify the 
Lebanese borders and end the threat of reintegration with Syria. In The Making of 
Modern Lebanon, Cobban argues that this was a valid concern as it had become the 
reality for all other independent territories France created in Syria. Meanwhile, Sunni 
Muslims sought to use independence to end French presence and influence in the 
12 Zamir, Lebanon 's Quest, 76-78. 
13 Rania Maktabi, "The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisitied. Who Are the Lebanese?' British Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies 26 (November 1999): 233. 
country.14 While French forces would eventually leave Lebanon in 1946 under pressure 
from England, this would prove to increase neither stability nor cooperation within the 
country. 
The 1943 Lebanese National Pact is yet another important political landmark, 
outlining the exact conditions of sectarian governance. The undocumented, unwritten 
pact developed the power sharing principle by granting Christian dominance in the 
government, parliament, and civil services by a ratio of six to every five Muslims, using 
outdated demographic data from the 1932 census. l5  Additionally, it set a tradition 
whereby the President must be Maronite, the Prime Minister Sunni Muslim, and the 
Speaker of the House Shiite ~ u s 1 i m . l ~  It is important to note that these ratios are fixed to 
that data, and do not reflect subsequent population changes. As such, Christian 
dominance was permanent, with no recognition of a need to reflect changes to the 
constituency. This unequal power sharing would become a strong contributor to sectarian 
based class inequality, and eventually, the outbreak of civil war. 
The single largest testament to the inherent instability and potential for conflict 
within the Lebanese political system is outbreak of a short civil war in 1958. Accord to 
Lebanese historian Fawwaz Traboulsi, the violence was based on issues purely internal to 
Lebanese politics, and occurred without an armed Palestinian presence in the country. 
The conflict was a result of Sunni anger over an attempt by President Chammoun to serve 
an extra-constitutional second consecutive term, as well as dissatisfaction over the 
balance of power sharing. Maronite anger stemmed mainly from a proposal that Lebanon 
14 Helena Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon, 66. 
15 Rania Maktabi, "The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisitied," 220. 
l 6  Ibid, 70. 
join the newly created union of Egypt and Syria, the United Arab Republic (uAR).'~ The 
development raises two major points that will be relevant to later discussion of blame in 
Lebanon. First, the president sought to blame the war on external forces, in this case the 
UAR, and refused to take into account internal domestic factors.'' And second, 12 years 
after independence and totally absent Palestinian interference, Lebanon was still mired in 
potentially violent sectarian conflict. 
Inherent Instability 
A brief examination of labor is one way to study the impact of the power sharing 
system on the Lebanese population. The imbalances in political control lead to similar 
inequalities along socio-economic lines. While the conflict in Lebanon is primarily 
between religious factions, this is in many ways synonymous with class. Christians as a 
whole benefited from their guaranteed dominance, while Muslims, and in particular 
Shiites, suffered from far greater levels of poverty. According to Halim Barakat, author 
of Lebanon in Strfe, by 1960 the elite 4% of the Lebanese population received one third 
of the national GDP, while 82% of the population received only 40% of the GDP.'~ This 
had a great deal to do with the types of jobs that they were able to obtain, another area in 
which the country is divided across sectarian lines. Through the 1950s, the ratio of 
Christians to Muslims was "10:2 in industry, 11 :2 in finance and 16:2 in services." 
Among the Industrial working class, 75% of workers were Muslim, primarily shiitee2' 
The broad extent to which religion and class intersected at this stage in the country's 
l7 Helena Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon, 89. 
"Ibid,  88. 
19 Halim Barakat, Lebanon in Strife (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977), 41. 
20 Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, 162. 
history is one of the many volatile issues already in place before the arrival of Palestinian 
refugees. 
One of the most significant contributors to instability in Lebanon was the 
continued reliance on a sectarian system of government. Its use in a community that 
already functioned primarily along religious lines had a strong impact on conceptions of 
identity and loyalty within the newly created state. As a result, one scholar argues, 
"[Lebanon] lacks that attachment to the national society as a whole." 2' Historians are 
largely in agreement that the communal framework of Lebanese society has preserved 
internal divisions and undermined a cohesive national identity. As Edward Shils writes in 
The Prospect for Lebanese Civility, citizens frequently give loyalty first to religious sect 
and local community, and then to the country. In periods of tension when particular sects 
are threatened, loyalty to the country as a whole takes a back seat. In Lebanon in Strife, 
social psychologist Halim Barakat attributes this to the historical geographic layout of 
each sect's territory, with Maronites in particular living in almost total isolation. 22 This 
particular placement of loyalty, and identification with sect over country creates an 
atmosphere were divisions are already drawn within the country, facilitating internal 
conflict. 
The sectarian and socio-economic rifts within Lebanese society adversely affected 
the ability of the government to function effectively as a representative of the overall 
population. According to Barakat, the concept of loyalty to sect before country extended 
to politicians and created a central government that was incapable of dealing with internal 
tension, but instead followed "policies of compromise, nonconfrontation, and quite often 
21 Edward Shils, The prospect for Lebanese Civility (New York: John Wily & sons, Inc., 1966), 2 
22 Barakat, Lebanon in Strife, 33-35. 
denial of the existence of challenging problems."23 This was particularly problematic as 
those confessional leaders who were in many cases directly involved in internal conflict 
were the politicians charged with its resolution. 
The political system in Lebanon was a strong factor contributing to the fragile 
state of the country. Barakat described it as an "unstable form of nongovernment that 
has.. .sustained the existing social cleavages" within the society. This corresponds to the 
position Shils takes, whereby the government was frequently purposefully inactive so as 
to forestall the possibility of conflict, leading to an unworkable system of governance.24 
It was ineffective, nonrepresentational, and supported class inequality. Yet for the 
dominant Christian parties, the system provided a convenient guarantee of power that 
they were unlikely to relinquish. Even as the country approached civil war in 1973, the 
Maronite scholar Elie Salem denied outright the faults of the system, asserting that it had 
"furthered rather than hindered modernization. The slow gains accomplished.. .are the 
result of stable political institutions and a formula for government based on conciliation 
and con~ensus ."~~ This chaotic and heavily divided scene is what Palestinian refugees 
encountered in 1948, just two years after Lebanese independence. 
Palestinian 
The presence of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is a direct result of the 1948 
Arab Israeli war, and the creation of the state of Israel. Palestinians remember it as Al- 
Nakba or 'The Catastrophe.' During the war, Zionist forces intimidated and expelled 
23 Barakat, Lebanon in Strife, 35 .  
24 Edward Shils, The prospect for Lebanese Civility, 4. 
25 Barakat, Lebanon in Strife, 186-187. 
26 This section will examine the expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland with regard to the ways in 
which it affected Lebanon. It is not intended to be a background or summary of Palestine mandate history 
or the 1948 war. 
over 700,000 Palestinian refugees to surrounding countries. Over 100,000 of these fled 
north, across the open border, to Lebanon. They first settled primarily in fifteen refugee 
camps across the country, as well as a number of unofficial gatherings.27 In the following 
oral testimony, one refugee, Selim Hindi, remembers the expulsion forty years later. 
We were frightened children. I was the oldest. We again spent the whole 
night hiding under the bridge to protect ourselves from bullets. Our fears 
were amplified by Zionist propaganda and by the massacres that were 
being carried out.. .The following day my father said that the only solution 
was for us to go to Lebanon. Our parents were convinced it was temporary, 
a question of two or three weeks, the time it would take for Arab arms to 
liberate ~alest ine.~ '  
As one studies the buildup to the civil war, the question inevitably emerges as to why 
Lebanon admitted refugees in the first place if it was indeed unfit to support them. As 
Hindi recalls, it was not initially assumed that Israel would defeat the Arab armies. 
Instead, it was taken for granted that the refugees would be returning in a matter of 
weeks, to the extent that Hindi's father did not see the need to take anything but a 
suitcase of clothes.29 When considering that the refugee presence was not initially 
thought to entail a long term burden on the state, the Lebanese decision not to reject 
refugees is easier understood. 
Because the Palestinian refugee crisis precedes the creation of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Palestinians do not fall under UNHCR 
jurisdiction. The United Nations body responsible for Palestinian refugees is The United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the near East (or 
UNRWA), which manages and runs those camps that it officially recognizes. 
27 Peteet, Landscape of Hope and Despair, 3-6. 
28 Selim Hindi, "Refugee Interviews," Journal of Palestine Studies 18 no. 1 (1988): 163. 
29 Hindi, "Refugee Interviews," 163. 
UNRWA was and still is responsible for the basic survival of refugees, providing 
rent-free space, shelter, basic rations, water, limited sewage disposal, health clinics and 
schools.30 But as legal scholar Susan Akram reveals in Palestinian Refugees and their 
Legal Status, because Palestinian Refugees do not fall under UNHCR jurisdiction, they 
do not benefit from the UNHCR protection mandate, they do not fall under an expanded 
definition of the term "refugee", and do not receive protections of the 195 1 Refugee 
Convention such as rights to property, freedom from undue restrictions on employment, 
primary education, and identity papers. Nor are Palestinians able to employ the UNHCR 
mechanisms in place to guarantee these rights.31 Free from an internationally recognized 
guarantee of protection, Lebanon has much broader power over the conditions of 
refugees within the country, unhindered by any form of international pressure. 
Palestinians refugees in Lebanon felt the immediate impact of sectarian class 
divides within the country. The form that their reception took was heavily dependent on 
their religion and socioeconomic status. The government granted Christian refugees 
citizenship relatively quickly, facilitating their involvement in those high paying 
professions restricted to Lebanese nationals, such as medicine, law, and engineering. A 
similar path was taken by wealthy Muslim refugees, who could afford to hire lawyers and 
prove Lebanese ancestry.32 While Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are commonly 
regarded as exclusively poor Sunni Muslims, this is an incomplete categorization, as it 
encompasses only those refugees forced to remain in the camps. 
30 Rosemary Sayigh, Too Many Enemies (New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1994), 23. 
3 1  Susan M. Akram, "Palestinian Refugees and their Legal Status," Journal of Palestine Studies 3 1 (Spring 
2002):36-39. 
32 Sayigh, Too Many Enemies, 23. 
Tension over the presence of Palestinians in Lebanon is primarily centered around 
their future settlement: permanent citizenship within the host country versus return to 
Palestine. As Simon Haddad lays out in an article addressing opposition to resettlement, 
if refugees are not able to repatriate, the naturalization of such a large number of 
Palestinians, primarily Sunni Muslim, would likely be sufficient to challenge Maronite 
dominance and the legitimacy of the 1932 census. No sect has openly supported 
permanent Palestinian settlement, as citizenship in Lebanon would weaken their claim to 
a right of return. Certainly the majority of Palestinians themselves have only expressed 
desire to return to their homeland.33 However the issue would continuously emerge 
throughout later events, consistently presenting the refugees as a threat to Lebanese 
security and sovereignty. It is important to note that when thousands of Christian 
Armenians fled to Lebanon after World War One, they were quickly granted 
citizenship.34   he tension in this case is directly related to the demographic threat Sunni 
refugees posed to Maronite power. 
While no party openly supported the permanent settlement of Palestinians in 
Lebanon, Israel's outright rejection of the right of return increased the likelihood of 
eventual settlement as the only option. Israel accepts no responsibility for the 1948 war, 
and thus the position of Palestinian refugees. Additionally, the return of such a large 
Muslim population would detract from the Jewish character of the Israeli state.35 The 
notion that Palestinians may be forced to permanently settle in Lebanon terrified the 
33 Simon Haddad, "The Origins of Popular Opposition to Palestinian Resettlement in Lebanon," 
International Migration Review 38 ( 1  964):47 1. 
34 David Gordon, Lebanon: The Fragmented Nation (London: Hoover Institute Press, 1980), 49. 
35 Rex Brynen, "Final Status Arrangements and Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon," Journal of Palestine 
Studies 26 (1997): 45.s 
Christian population and thus gained credibility even if it had no support within the 
country. 
This threat of permanent settlement or tawteen would give rise to the flawed 
theory that any improvement of refugee conditions and rights would eventually lead to 
both a desire and ability to gain citizenship. However scholarship and oral histories 
clearly demonstrate that the need of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland is not 
based on the deplorable conditions in Lebanon, and an improvement in those conditions 
would not eliminate that need. The statement of Muhammad al-Bajirmi of the Rashidiyya 
camp focuses on the importance of return whilst recognizing a positive Palestinian role in 
Lebanon. 
There is not a single Palestinian who has designs on the soil of Lebanon. 
On the contrary, we are ready for any sacrifice for Lebanon and its people, 
and we consider our residence in this country temporary. But the Lebanese 
government should help us lead a decent and human life. We contributed 
through the sweat of our brow to the building of the Lebanese economy - 
the south and other regions are witness to this. Palestinian hands labored 
alongside Lebanese hands to develop south Lebanon's agriculture, and it's 
not right to treat us like foreigners.36 
The statement is part of one set of oral histories released by the Journal of 
Palestine Studies in 1995. It is a particularly valuable source due to a shortage of 
Palestinian testimony addressing Lebanon. For example, the major oral history project 
dealing with Palestinians in Lebanon, the Nakba Archive, documents expulsion from 
Israel only up to initial resettlement in ~ e b a n o n . ~ ~  Almost all orals statement of 
- 
36 Muhammad al-Bajirmi , "Palestinian Refugees of Lebanon Speak" interview by 'Abd al-Salam Aql, 
Journal of Palestine Studies 25 no. 1 (1995): 57-58. 
37 
"Nakba Archive"' http://www.nakba-archive.org/. 
Palestinians in Lebanon were recorded after the war, and so it is difficult to determine the 
ways in which these statements would have changed over time. 
However, the sentiment is clear: Palestinians want to go home but deserve decent living 
conditions until then. Nevertheless, the fear of a connection between improved living 
conditions and settlement was and remains one of the strongest influences on Lebanese 
government refugee policy. 
Prewar Conditions 
The initial reception of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is reflected in their early 
conditions and treatment. In turn, this would have a strong effect on the actions of 
refugees in the buildup to the outbreak of war in 1975. For those refugees unable to gain 
Lebanese citizenship, their living conditions were characterized by severe poverty, 
hardship, and economic marginalization. UNRWA was fitting 4-6 families in a single 
tent, and as Rosemary Sayigh documents in Struggle for Survival, winters were cold 
enough in some areas in the years after 1948 for children to freeze to death. 38 Families 
soon spent any money they had, including women's dowry jewe11-y.~~ Health conditions 
in the refugee camps were abysmal, with overcrowded camps contributing to high rates 
of gastroenteritis, respiratory infections and skin problems. Doctors or nurses based 
within the camps were rare before the 1970s, and so basic medical attention was only 
available during limited clinic hours.40 Rather than working to alleviate these deplorable 
conditions, Lebanon used fear of permanent settlement to ensure that they were 
exacerbated through a long series of legal restrictions. 
38 Rosemary Sayigh, "The Struggle for Survival: The Economic Conditions of Palestinian Camp Residents 
in Lebanon," Journal of Palestine Studies 7 (1978): 106. 
39 Rosemary Sayigh, "Palestinian Camp Women as Tellers of History," Journal ofPalestine Studies 27 
(1998): 51. 
40 Sayigh, Too Many Enemies, 55-57. 
The lives of Palestinians in Lebanon were strictly governed by a number of laws, 
structured to ensure that refugees would never feel comfortable enough to settle 
permanently.41 The most consequential of these are the limitations placed upon the ability 
of Palestinians to obtain work, severely attenuating the potential for any improvement in 
their conditions. In 195 1, the Lebanese Minister of Labor attempted to prohibit 
employment of all Palestinians in the country. While he was unsuccessful, Palestinians 
were required to apply for work permits, ensuring that they would be limited to those low 
paying jobs unattractive to the Lebanese population, such as agriculture and construction. 
Fayza 'Adas of the Burj al-Barajneh Camp described the situation years later in 1994: 
"They try to break us every day. The education of our youth is wasted. Our university 
graduates are forced to work as masons.. .The Lebanese authorities won't give them a 
work permit.42" It was illegal for refugees to work in government and foreign institutions, 
and they could not join the Lebanese syndicates that controlled access to high paying 
'fi-ee  profession^.'^^ By limiting refugees to filling in the gaps of the job market, strict 
Lebanese labor law ensured that class mobility would be unachievable for Palestinians. 
They were to struggle for survival, deprived of any means to influence their conditions. 
Palestinians in Lebanon felt unwelcome in every aspect of life. Their civil rights 
were undermined in almost every category. Refugees were unable to access basic 
government services from the very beginning, such as education, health, and social 
benefits. Laws over property ownership would fluctuate over the decades, but initially 
Palestinians could not own property without going through a lengthy and expensive 
41 Jaber Suleiman, "Trapped Refugees: The Case of Palestinians in Lebanon," conference paper, 2009 
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44 process. In the 1965, the League of Arab states signed the Casablanca protocol granting 
rights to work, travel, and residency to Palestinian refugees. Lebanon was the only 
country to submit caveats before signing. These included an insistence by the Lebanese 
government on the right to restrict work and travel, insuring that the position of refugees 
would remain unchanged, and rendering the document largely ineffe~t ive .~~ In what has 
become known as the protection gap, Lebanon consistently worked to ensure the tenuous 
legal stability of refugees in the country. 
Refugees in Lebanon faced systematic discrimination and abuse. In one telling 
example, Palestinians dreaded the checkpoints at the entrance points to refugee camps, as 
they provided an opportunity for Lebanese officials to humiliate and physically abuse 
refugees.46 Because workers passed through those checkpoints daily, they were 
constantly facing discrimination. These types of abuse were not limited to the camps, and 
continued throughout the buildup to the war. In 1973, a New York Times article 
documented a Lebanese army captain ordering a Palestinian prisoner to lie on the ground 
to be abused. 
A Lebanese in civilian clothes came up and kicked the Palestinian. The 
prisoner writhed. 'These are filthy savages' the man shouted. 'if we had 
our way we would kill them all.' The man identified himself as a member 
of the militia of the right-wing, predominantly Christian Phalange party.. . 
'They want to change our Good system and make Lebanon Communist,' 
he said. 'We are armed and if the army will not put an end to this, we 
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The army was clearly engaging in the physical abuse of prisoners by allowing a civilian 
combatant to attack a Palestinian detainee. The outraged reaction to these types of 
discriminatory repressive actions and living conditions was a major cause behind rising 
tensions building up to the civil war. Both discrimination and extensive legal restrictions 
had an adverse impact on conceptions of Palestinian identity among refugees. According 
to Julie Peteet in Landscape of Hope and Despair, Palestinians were "acutely aware of 
the abnormality of their daily lives" in comparison to the rest of Lebanese society.48 
There was a clear attempt by the Lebanese population to project an artificial subordinate 
identity on refugees by emphasizing their alien nature, despite the fact that Palestinian 
ethnicity, language, and culture are near identical to those of Lebanon. In fact, this 
eventually had the opposite effect through the formation of a Palestinian Identity in 
Lebanon. 
The deplorable living conditions faced by Palestinian refugees engendered a 
transition within their identity from refugees to returnees, and pushed some to take a 
more militant position on their situation. The term refugee carries the connotations of a 
helpless victim, while returnee indicates both purpose and agency. One Palestinian in 
Lebanon, Samiya, connects the return to Palestine with improved rights and living 
conditions. "I.. .knew Palestine was where we could achieve our rights as human beings. 
I had a vague awareness that our misery was because we were Palestinians -people from 
another place, who live here, in Lebanon, but are not from here."49 Viewed from this 
angle, the militarization of Palestinian refugees that would later be seen as a threat to 
state sovereignty was in fact brought about by Lebanese policy. But it is also an excellent 
48 Peteet, Landscape of Hope and Despair, 124. 
49 Ibid, 146-148. 
illustration of the fact that, from the perspective of Palestinians, a return to their home 
was associated with human rights, in direct contrast to the constructed connection 
between hypothetical human rights improvements and the threat of permanent settlement 
in Lebanon. 
The idea that Lebanese policy had a strong impact on the militarization of the 
refugee population is backed up statistically. A 1977 study by Rosemary Sayigh found 
that most of the people interviewed had "first become conscious of their Palestinian 
identity through specific experiences of marginality." One respondent attributed his 
militant activism to the influence of seeing his father as a victim. "The misery of his 
father's life as an agricultural day laborer in Lebanon had affected him deeply."50 The 
policy of restrictions whereby refugees were forced to live in deplorable conditions had a 
strong impact on the appeal of the militant option as an avenue of improvement. 
Emerging Militancy 
The late 1960s and early 1970s was a period of transformation for the position of 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. In 1964, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, or 
PLO, was formed and quickly gained recognition among Arab countries as the official 
Palestinian representative entity. Fateh, its largest faction, formed as a militant guerilla 
movement and commenced operations in 1965. The emergence of a cohesive, 
independent Palestinian body held significant implications for the role of refugee camps 
and populations. Most importantly, it facilitated the transformation of their role, from 
refugees to returnees. After the defeat of the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian armies in 
the 1967 six day war, the Palestinian resistance movement assumed a much larger role in 
50 Rosemary Sayigh, "A Study of a Palestinian Camp in Lebanon," Journal of Palestine Studies 6 (Summer 
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the struggle against ~srael." This opened the possibility of involvement within that 
struggle among a refugee population that was gradually losing faith in the ability of Arab 
states to liberate their homeland. 
The Cairo Agreement, signed in 1969, solidified the position of the Palestinian 
resistance in Lebanon. The document was initially kept secret, not publicized until much 
later. It guaranteed freedom of transportation, and legitimated armed commando 
movements as long as they remained in agreement with "the principles of Lebanon's 
sovereignty and security."" While the agreement was a significant step forward for 
Palestinians in Lebanon, its passage does not necessarily indicate a softened Christian 
stance towards the refugee presence. According to Marius Deep, author of The Lebanese 
Civil War, it is likely that Christian ministers only signed the agreement in hope of 
securing support for presidency bids from Muslim lawmakers.53 
While the legitimization of Palestinian militants under the Cairo Agreement was 
not made public, it did result in their acquisition of control over the refugee camps. 
Initially, the camps were under the strict supervision of the Lebanese intelligence and 
police forces. The Cairo agreement facilitated the transfer of camp control to Palestinian 
commandos after 1969, a move that was immediately supported by the oppressed rehgee 
population. One refugee, identified on as Rafiq, describes the power transition within the 
Ain El-Hilweh camp: "In the camp, the idea that you were freed fi-om the reign of the 
Lebanese Intelligence and police was overwhelming because we had been living under 
the terror of these people. Our first reaction was to get rid of them in a very humiliating 
-- 
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way."54 This is clearly a response to the conditions in which Palestinians in Lebanon 
were forced to live for decades before the formation of the PLO, but also reveals the 
anger that refugees felt towards their situation, and a willingness to react to it. 
A critical event in this period of transition was the 197 1 arrival of the PLO in 
Lebanon. Initially, the bulk of commandos operated out of Jordan, the country with the 
largest Palestinian population, as well as the host of the PLO headquarters. This would 
radically transform with the conflict of Black September in 197 1. The conflict began in 
1970, when Jordan attempted to reign in the Palestinian commandos who were operating 
freely across Jordanian territory. The Council of Ministers issued a document intended to 
regulate or ban arms, vehicle use, gatherings, and party a~t iv i t i es .~~  Each party blamed 
the other for the resultant year of conflict, termed a massacre by the Arab The 
PLO was finally expelled from Jordan in 197 1, and the Salam government took no action 
to prevent their movement into Lebanon. Commandos settled primarily in southern 
Lebanon, which became the central base of operations against ~srael .~" This would have 
lasting implications for the Palestinian population, as Israeli retaliation in south Lebanon 
would become the primary grievance of the host population against the Palestinian 
presence. 
The arrival of the PLO marks the transition of the Palestinian presence from a 
marginalized community to a powerful bloc and perceived military threat to the Lebanese 
state. Due in part to Palestinian vulnerability systematically enforced by the host state, a 
strong resistance presence was now in Lebanon, legally supported by the Cairo 
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~~reemen t . "  PLO involvement in internal Lebanese issues was both complicated and 
multi-faceted. On one hand, they took provocative actions such as setting up military 
checkpoints in certain areas and checking identification, actions that would later trigger 
the phrase "state within a state." On the other hand, they posed a challenge to the 
dominant Christian leadership by pushing leftist parties to press for fulfillment of 
demands.59 The PLO played a double role, exacerbating existent divides while at the 
same time creating additional conflict and tension. 
There was initially some strong support in Lebanon for the commando raids 
against Israel. A number of Muslims, and even some Christians among the Lebanese 
population had joined Palestinian commando organizations. When Khalil Al-Jamal 
became the first Lebanese commando killed in action, his funeral was followed by 
massive demonstrations calling for unrestricted freedom of activity for Palestinian 
militants in Lebanese territory. The proposal earned the immediate public support of 
Prime Minister Abdallah a l -~a f i . ~ '  But while support for the Palestinian cause itself 
continued to receive verbal support from most political parties, this type of popular 
support for direct action and unrestricted freedom would disintegrate following the 
consequences of Israeli retaliation. 
In an effort to quell PLO operations against its northern demarcation line, Israel 
launched a number of large scale attacks across Lebanon. These were targeted at 
Palestinian commandos, but had dire consequences for the general population, and in 
particular the Shiite of the south. These attacks are perhaps the single most significant 
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factor contributing to animosity against Palestinians in Lebanon. While issues of 
permanent settlement presented a hypothetical threat to Christian dominance, the attacks 
had a very real impact across the country and could not be ignored. Because those most 
severely affected were Shiites living in close proximity to southern refugee camps, 
widespread anger towards the militants was no longer restricted to the Christian 
population. 
The first large scale Israeli attack against south Lebanon took place on the last day 
of 1968 when Israeli commandos blew up 13 civilian airliners at Beirut International 
airport. The attacks continued through the civil war eventually resulted with Israeli 
occupation of Southern ~ e b a n o n . ~ ~  The incredible scale of Israeli operations in Lebanon 
is described by PLO executive chairman Yasser Arafat in a 1970 Press interview: 
There were not more than 750 commandos engaged in the fighting.. .We faced 
an Israeli armored brigade of 100 Patton tanks, 200 armored cars and mechanized 
vehicles, and from 60 to 70 planes which flew over the area for 14 hours on the 
first day and ten hours on the second.. .the fighting lasted for 34 hours ... I 
was present at the 1956 fighting on the banks of the Suez Canal, I was present 
during the Jun 5, 1967 operations and I took part in the Battle of Karameh and 
the subsequent operations, but I have never seen aircraft in such density, such 
continued shooting and such profuse firing as I saw in the Arqub fighting.62 
It is clearly evident that Arafat has an interest in presenting the battle as one that was 
difficult. As the chainnab of the PLO issuing a press statement in an increasingly hostile 
country, it would only make sense for him to emphasize the commando struggle playing 
a defensive role. But allowing for that, it is still clear that Israeli reprisal in Lebanon was 
severe. In particular, the heavy use of aircraft and tanks indicates that Israeli troops were 
not overly concerned with killing nearby civilians. These types of reprisals would have a 
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detrimental effect on the reputation of, and support for, Palestinians in Lebanon. 
In a 1972 New York Times article, one villager stated that he was equally "afraid 
of both the Israelis and the [Palestinian] guerillas."63 According the article, "the reason 
for widespread fear of the commandos.. .was not any misconduct on their part toward the 
villagers, but their ability to provoke the Israelis into retaliation without being able to 
protect the population."64 ~ h e s e  types of fears were confirmed time and again. In 1975, 
damage from Israeli artillery destroyed 166 out of 202 homes in the village of Shuba. 
1,500 Lebanese citizens, the entire population, abandoned the village for shelter in areas 
under Lebanese army control.65 While the Palestinians did not destroy the village, they 
would not avoid blame for the incident. 
Israeli ministers lost no time in attempting to connect anger over the attacks with 
the Palestinian refugee population. In 197 1, the Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan 
released a statement saying "when the Lebanese authorities allow the terrorists to operate 
against us from their soil, we have no alternative but to cross the frontier.66" This 
statement was reiterated in 1972 by Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon: 
We have more than once warned the Lebanese Government that if Terrorist 
activity is resumed we shall take action ourselves to stop it.. .We fulfilled 
our duty to the security of Israeli citizens and took action ourselves. This 
is not only a punishment, but also an example of the operations we shall 
adopt in the future on this scale or another until an end is put to terrorism. 
I would strongly advise the Lebanese premier to learn before it is too late.67 
By pinning the responsibility for the attacks firmly on the shoulders of the Lebanese 
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government, Allon was able to increase tension between the PLO and Lebanon. 
Additionally, he used that justification to transplant the Lebanese outrage over the attacks 
from Israeli forces to the Palestinian presence. 
The Lebanese government resisted Israeli pressure initially. In 1970, the Lebanese 
Foreign Ministry issued a memorandum to the ambassadors of Britain, France, The 
USSR and the US labeling the attack violence "directed against the civilian population" 
and branding Israeli justification "a &tile excuse." However this stance soon gave way 
as public pressure built up on the government to use the Lebanese army for national 
defense and bring it into the conflict. In May of 1970, the Council of Ministers banned 
the firing of rockets from Lebanese territory and strictly controlled the carrying of all 
other arms.69 This standoff over the legitimacy of border attacks would form the basis for 
the escalation of tension in Lebanon, as the various sectarian alliances took sides on the 
issue. 
Internal Conflict 
The attacks also served to highlight the politicized nature of the Lebanese army as 
a tool for internal control rather than national defense. The government never deployed 
the army for the defense of the southern Lebanese border; that conflict was strictly 
between the PLO and Israel. During this period of the 1960s and 1970s, the army was 
only used for internal repression, often against students, workers and peasants. In fact, 
Traboulsi reveals in A History of Modern Lebanon that a 200 million LL (Lebanese Lira) 
army modernization project in 1969 procured weapons that were "unfit for national 
defense purposes." This included such purchases as French AMX 12 light tanks that 
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would only have been useful internally.70 As no action was taken in response to 
increasing calls for protection of southern villages, it became clear that the army was only 
in place to protect the system, not the people. After a 1973 attack by Israeli commandos 
on the streets of Beirut, an attempt by Prime Minister Salam to dismiss the head of the 
army concluded with a Presidential declaration that the head of the army was 
untouchable, and the dismissal of ~ a l a m . ~ '  The controversy over the army is yet another 
issue that predated the Palestinians but was enflamed by their presence and proximity. 
The very presence of the Palestinian population was a significant factor in the rise 
of the Lebanese student movement and tension between students and the army. During 
the late 1960s, student involvement in ideological political parties rose to new levels. As 
Barakat argues, "Students became increasingly disenchanted with the West and began to 
realize that colonization had continued to plague their countries in spite of 
independence.72"Student protests against western interference, usually led by Palestinian 
students, were frequently organized around support for the Palestinian resistance 
movement. Political activity among students at the prestigious American University of 
Beirut was so widespread that the university required all enrolled students to sign a 
pledge in which they agreed not to interfere in campus academic activity.73 The army was 
frequently used to quell demonstrations, and the internal use of force became yet another 
case in which Palestinian presence unearthed existing issues and inequalities. 
One 1969 demonstration in response to restrictions on Palestinian guerrillas 
highlights the rift that emerged between the government and its constituency. The New 
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York Times covered the demonstration, reporting that of the Palestinians, students, and 
Leftist political party members present, "seven persons had been killed and scores injured 
in clashes between security forces and demonstrators." The government imposed a 
curfew, and censored all forms of communication that "undermine national security.74" 
That the government was willing to use the national army on the Lebanese population, 
but not in defense of the country became a pattern that contributed to the tension leading 
up to the civil war. 
After a raid by Israeli commandos into the capital city of Beirut went 
unchallenged, Druze leader Jumblat questioned the commitment of the government to its 
people and essentially encouraged the acquisition of arms by the civilian population. In a 
1973 statement, he claimed "it is clear that is it now the duty of every loyal and patriotic 
Lebanese who fears molestation by Israel in one form or another to take steps to ensure 
his own defense.75" The fact that a prominent political leader was encouraging the 
population to arm itself may have been a result of his position against the dominant 
Christian leadership. But is in any case, is an indicator of just how close the country was 
to civil war. 
As the issue of Palestinians in Lebanon consistently became more volatile, other 
aspects of the country experienced similar instability. The most prominent and relevant of 
these was the economy. By 1974, foreign banks controlled 80% of bank deposits in 
Lebanon. While banks in Lebanon possessed over LL 6 billion, primarily due to 
Lebanese banking laws, very little of this went into the local community. In fact, a 
poverty belt had already encircled the capital city of Beirut, formed mainly of Palestinian 
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refugees and Shiite that had fled north to avoid border violence and an average income 
less than 19% of the city average. This was compounded by the fact that the cost of living 
in Lebanon had doubled between 1967 and 1975. Imported meat was being sold for up to 
10 times the purchase price, while Lebanese agricultural product costs were heavily 
inflated, selling for a full 40% lower in Saudi ~ r a b i a . ~ ~  This period of economic 
hardship, directly preceding the start of the civil war had differing impacts depending on 
sect and region, and was a strong factor in the outbreak of violence as grievances built up. 
In a 2006 study, Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch concluded that 
there was a positive correlation between the very presence of refugees from a 
neighboring country and the outbreak of civil war due to a continued proximity to the 
cause of expulsion. They claimed that it would be prudent for host countries in that case 
to take preemptive action by managing humanitarian needs and addressing security issues 
before they arise.77 Lebanon is a prime example of a case where this did not take place. 
Palestinians in Lebanon had certainly brought their conflict with them, and the 
host government neglected them on a basic humanitarian level. Rather than addressing 
security concerns, the government chose to legitimate refugee militancy through a legal 
document. The study documents the extent to which the arrival of refugees often 
corresponds to an increase in conflict when the host government does nothing to stave 
this off. The data might be used to link Palestinian refugees to eruption of civil war. But 
more effectively, it constitutes further evidence that the very presence of the Palestinians, 
as a refugee population in an unstable country, was more consequential than any 
provocative action they may have taken. 
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Changing Perceptions 
The presence of the PLO, the conflict with Israel, and their impact on the 
population changed the way in which Palestinians were viewed in Lebanon. Not 
surprisingly the differing positions depended heavily on sectarian identity. Another 
element of note is the distinction made between the overall Palestinian cause and the 
specific actions of commandos and refugees. While 'the Palestinians' are commonly 
referenced as one monolithic entity throughout scholarship of Lebanese history, there 
were stark distinctions between various aspects of the population as well as the overall 
'Palestinian cause.' This is true of both the actions of individual Palestinians, as well as 
they way in which they were perceived and treated. While the Palestinian cause was so 
popular throughout the Middle East during the second half the 2oth century, no party was 
willing to come out openly against it. In particular, Christian leaders often claimed to 
support Palestinians in general while condemning the actions of the PLO in Lebanon, 
despite the fact that the physical manifestation of Palestinian cause at the time consisted 
primarily of PLO action from Lebanon. 
Sectarian leaders in Lebanon had very differkg views on the actions and impact 
of Palestinians in the country. The Druze leader Jumblat consistently came out in support 
of Palestinian actions. In a 1970 radio interview following internal violence involving 
Palestinian commandos, he declared that they had "behaved like angels."78 Similarly in 
1972, the Sunni Prime Minister acknowledged some tension within the country, but 
declared that "the mutual links and mutual confidence between us and our Palestinian 
brethren have had and are having excellent results," and denied the possibility of armed 
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conflict with Palestinians in ~ e b a n o n . ~ ~  The Christian leadership took a different 
position. In a statement later that year, Maronite leader Gemayyel made the initial claim 
of support for the broad Palestinian struggle, but then went on to accuse the refugees of 
occupying Lebanon. "The Resistance demands our frontiers as a base for its operations, it 
is imposing a sort of occupation on us and leading us into battle."" It is clear by the vast 
divergence among these viewpoints that opinions of the Palestinians in the country 
depended far more on the possible implications for the sect in question rather than any 
specific actions of the Palestinians themselves. 
The PLO executive committee response directly contradicts the Gemayyel 
Statement. 
We are.. .amazed that the Palestinian presence in Lebanese territory should 
be described s an army of occupation.. .Where does the Palestinian People 
exercise this imagined occupation? Does it's adherence to the provisions of 
the Cairo Agreement and its insistence on its right to defend its existence and 
dignity in the camp make it an army of occupation?81 
It is important to keep in mind that these accounts are not impartial reports, but rather the 
personal accounts of each highly invested party, representing the situation as they 
perceive it. The executive committee has an obvious interest in promoting the positive 
image of the PLO in Lebanon. However, the existence of such completely contradictory 
statements underscores the complexity of the situation, and the contested role of 
Palestinians in Lebanon. 
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Chapter 2: Sustained Violence 
The Lebanese Civil War is as complex and murky a subject as the years leading 
up to it. Historians now simplify the war by placing it within the fifteen year period 
between 1975 and 1990, but by looking at primary sources from this time period, it is 
clear that the war actually took place in individual, independent stages. Each stage 
involved Palestinians in a different way, affecting the memory of militants and refugees 
in Lebanon. In this section, the focus is on the stage between 1975 and 1976. This two 
year period is remembered as the start of the civil war, and involved primarily Palestinian 
refugees and Maronite Christian Phalange militias. 
Each of these stages caused a different set of reactions towards the Palestinian 
presence in Lebanon, culminating in widespread animosity and blame in the postwar 
period. By examining each stage using oral histories, political speeches, and scholarly 
analysis from multiple viewpoints, it is possible to discern the elements contributing to 
that animosity. Viewed against the backdrop of blame, the start of the civil war is of 
particular interest because Palestinians initially played the role of victim. In 1975, 
Maronite shooters fired upon a bus carrying camp refugees. 82 Different sources put the 
death toll from the massacre between 2 1-27 Palestinians, but as stated in David 
Gilmour's Lebanon, it is overwhelmingly remembered as the start of the civil war.83 
Contemporary scholarly assessment acknowledges the postwar Palestinian reputation in 
Lebanon as purely negative. In examination of contemporary Lebanese attitudes towards 
the civil war, Sune Haugbolle speaks of an "implicit consensus that Palestinians bore a 
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substantial responsibility for the war."84 However, this has not always been the case as is 
clear from the initial years of the civil war. 
This section is an attempt to determine some of the ways in which Palestinians 
were viewed in the early years of the war, so that it can be compared to a shift in 
collective memory. Palestinians would later be transferred from the role of victim to that 
of instigator. This point is critical to understand, as the issue of memory and blame will 
mold the position of Palestinians in Lebanon during the postwar period. 
First and foremost, it is important to place the start of the civil war in its historical 
context. While the bus incident served as the impetus for the eruption of sustained 
violence, it was also a product of the tense and fragile political situation. The bus incident 
itself was actually in response to a previous shooting where unidentified gunmen killed 
four of Phalange leader Pierre Gemeyal's bodyguards in East ~ e i n r t . ~ ~  It is a testament to 
the state of polarization of the country, that the Maronite militias instantly assumed the 
gunmen to be ~ a l e s t i n i a n . ~ ~  That the shooting where the Maronite community was under 
attack is not considered the start of the war may be attributed to the lack of widespread 
fighting stemming directly from it, or the fact that the identity of the gunmen has never 
been confirmed. In Robert Fisk's acclaimed narrative of the war, Pity the Nation, it is 
presented as a Maronite justification that would later be raised.87 But while this previous 
shooting is often glossed over, it is important to emphasize that the bus incident did not 
occur in a vacuum. The massacre caused "large scale battles" to break out across the area, 
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in which heavy artillery was used internally in Lebanon for the first time.88 Because it is 
this incident that is remembered as having triggered the war, and not the one in which 
Palestinian perpetrators may have been involved, Palestinians are still presented by 
historians such as Gilmour as the initial victims.89 Interestingly enough, this memory has 
persisted alongside the broad allegations of blame leveled at Palestinians for the war. 
Directly following the bus incident, criticism towards the phalange party spread 
across the country. The Arab Front called for a boycott of the party in Lebanon, saying 
"As a result of the latest massacre they have perpetrated, the Phalangists have become 
even more isolated and there has been wide-scale resentment of them in all Lebanese 
circles, including those which the Phalangists claim the 'right7 to represent."90 While it is 
clear from the rest of the document that the Arab Front has distinct pro Palestinian 
leanings, the accusation that Maronites in Lebanon resented the Phalange party carries 
serious weight in sectarian Lebanon. The document does not simply make a claim against 
the Maronite party, but contends that this opposition is widespread across the country, 
including the Maronite population. 
The Arab Front was joined by Druze minister Kamal Jumblatt, who called for a 
government boycott of the Phalange party in response to the massacre. Jumblatt stated 
that he would withhold confidence from any government in which Phalange participated, 
buttressing reports of anti-Maronite sentiment following the shootings. In response, a 
number of Maronite ministers resigned, bringing down the government of Prime Minister 
Rachid ~ o l h . ~ '  However, even though the violence was pitting Lebanese civilians against 
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one another and had already brought down the government, Palestinians were still not the 
target of widespread blame for the situation. 
In his 1975 resignation statement, Lebanese Prime Minister Solh makes his 
position on the issue evident. "It is clear that the Kata'ib [Phalange] Party bears full 
responsibility for the massacre, for the consequent complications, and for the deaths, the 
damages, both physical and moral, which have afflicted the country as a result."92 While 
the Prime Minister is Sunni Muslim as dictated by the 1943 National Pact, the 
assumption cannot be made that he supports the Palestinian position. In fact, Prime 
Ministers in the post war years would later speak out vocally against the presence and 
improved condition of Palestinian refugees. But initially in 1975, Prime Minister Solh 
laid the blame fully on the Maronite militia, accusing them of "attempts to expand the 
fighting between Lebanese and Palestinians and between the Lebanese them~elves."~~ At 
this point, Palestinians are still viewed as the victims of a massacre and not the instigators 
of the violence. 
While the statements used here as evidence are taken from traditional opponents 
of the Maronite party in Lebanon, this does not necessarily discredit them. I am not 
attempting to prove that Palestinians bear no responsibility for the eruption of the civil 
war, but rather that they were not initially the sole recipients of accusation and blame as 
would later be the case. That said, the fact that Sunni and Druze leaders immediately used 
the incident to come out against their Maronite rivals, is just one more testament to the 
deep internal divisions present in Lebanon. In fact, some historical scholarship seriously 
downplays the contributions of the Palestinian presence to the start of the civil war. In 
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Lebanon in Strife, Halim Barakat claims "throughout the first year of the war, 
the.. .PLO.. .continued to call for a peaceful solution and constantly warned that the PLO 
might not be able to pursue a policy of moderation any longer."94 Barakat makes the 
claim that commandos entered the battle reluctantly, and would have preferred to confine 
their activities to the struggle against Israel. 
When Phalange party leader Gemayel addresses the massacre in a press 
conference months later, even he does not overtly blame the Palestinian presence for the 
outbreak of hostilities. Although he accuses them of occupying the country towards the 
end of the speech, the bulk of his accusations are directed against a "force that came from 
outside infiltrated into Lebanese and Palestinian circles and forced on us a battle that is 
not ours and drove us into the odious course of civil war."95 Likewise, the Maronite 
Patriarch Kreish withheld allegations against Palestinians, instead blaming the inherent 
issues in Lebanon: "there are 1500 complicated problems in this country and they 
accumulated and all exploded at once."96 With the addition of the country's Maronite 
leadership to the list of parties not directing significant blame on the Palestinian presence, 
it is difficult to envisage the state of affairs two decades later when they are seen across 
the country only as an invasive presence. Much of the following sections on the civil war 
attempt to determine to the ways in which this shift occurred, and extent to which it was 
either a result of Palestinian actions or a change in the way the events are remembered. 
No analysis of initial positions in the Lebanese civil war is complete without an 
examination of the positions of Palestinians themselves. The Palestinian leadership 
continued to maintain that they had no political ambitions in the country, a position that 
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reinforced the arguments being made in their favor. In any initial statement addressing 
the violence, Chairman Arafat and the PLO executive committee stressed the dependence 
of the Palestinian revolution on stability in Lebanon, but also demanding that Lebanon 
allow commando activity to continue.97 This statement was later clarified in a press 
interview with Central Committee member Khalaf "We want only that our stay in 
Lebanon be a temporary one until such time as we can move from all the areas where we 
are present in the Arab world back to our country."98 Though this position may have 
initially improved the reputation of Palestinians in Lebanon, it would become more 
difficult to maintain as Palestinians became more involved in the war. 
Regarding the instigation of violence, it is clear that Palestinians were initially 
able to avoid the blame and accusations in which they would later become immersed. A 
large part of this has to do with the eagerness with which Sunni and Druze 
representatives took the opportunity to attack their political rivals, a result of the 
entrenched sectarian issues in Lebanon. As the war progressed and Palestinians continued 
to play a major role, eventually prompting foreign invasion, that position would be less 
convincing. 
The Massacre of Tel al-Zaatar 
The initial stage of the Lebanese civil war culminated in the Tel al-Zaatar 
massacre of 1976. As with much of Lebanese history from the civil war period, the 
details of the massacre are difficult to pinpoint with satisfactory reliability due to a 
scarcity of sources, as well as contradictions among the sources that do exist. But this 
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paper is not intended to constitute a narrative history of the war. Rather, I am interested in 
the way that the massacre demonstrates the hatred already leveled against Palestinians in 
Lebanon at this stage, the lack of distinction made between perceptions of Palestinian 
combatants and noncombatant refugees, and the experience of noncombatant Palestinian 
refugees caught in the middle of the conflict. While Tel al-Zaatar is often overshadowed 
in historical accounts by the Sabra and Shatila Massacres, it is the event that lays the 
foundation for Palestinian mistrust of Lebanese society. Subsequent Palestinian insistence 
on maintaining their own camp security is founded in this mistrust, and would later 
become the base for later claims that the camps formed volatile security islands, outside 
of Lebanese law. 
Tel al-Zaatar was an UNRWA run Palestinian refugee camp, situated in Maronite 
controlled East Beirut. Towards the end of 1975, Maronite forces had begun to carry out 
what they called "cleaning" operations. It was a policy of sectarian cleansing and 
imposed geographic segregation, under which they expelled Muslim residents from 
traditional Maronite strongholds. On June 4 of 1976, the cleansing operation reached the 
Tel al-Zaatar camp in the shape of a two month long siege.99 The camp finally fell to 
Maronite forces under the command of Bashir Gemayel, the son of Pierre Gemayel, a 
prominent Christian leader with strong positions against Palestinian refugees. According 
to Helena Cobban in The Making of Modern Lebanon, as camp residents fled the area, " 
Christian fighters "picked out all the men and youths they could spot, for summary 
execution." They massacred 1500 Palestinians that day alone, in addition to another 700 
killed during the siege, with no distinction made between commandos and noncombatant 
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fighters.'OO The Tel al-Zaatar Massacre was the first instance of mass refugee killings in 
Lebanon, and served to embed in Palestinian memory the extent of their vulnerability at 
the hands of the host population. It is a powerful and deeply troubling narrative that 
would later be overshadowed by dominant presentations of Palestinians as a threat to the 
Lebanese state. 
In post-war Lebanon, the government would capitalize on the image of violent 
Palestinians responsible for the civil war, in the interest of propping up the sectarian 
balance of an unsustainable government. Personal accounts of Palestinian suffering and 
hardship are critical to contesting that narrative. While it is not my intention to present 
Palestinians purely as inactive victims, to omit the accounts of their trials in the interest 
of fulfilling a political goal is unacceptable. One camp resident, Abu Mohamed Aina, 
remembers the conditions during the siege of Tel al-Zaater: 
Water became the most serious problem. We had to risk the threat of 
snipers to get water from the tank which was situated about 20 feet 
away from the Phalangist area.. .The water tank was like a death trap 
because it was situated in an open area. Snipers were everywhere, and 
even when someone tried to take the injured away from the water area, 
they were shot at. I heard that on one occasion a woman was shot at while 
trying to get back after collecting water. She was shot in the chest, but 
kept running clutching the water holder until she reached safety because 
to her the water was more important than life. Then, one litre [sic] of water 
was equal to one litre of blood.lO' 
Aina reveals the way in which the siege and the treatment of Palestinians in the camp 
affected the entire population, without regard to who was actually a combatant. 
Assailants indiscriminately targeted the entire camp refugee population. The living 
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conditions described in the Tel al-Zaatar camp will be an important point of reference 
when examining the way in which Palestinians are depicted and remembered after the 
civil war. The dynamic of power established by the siege and massacre, in which 
Palestinians are denied basic rights and safety, is a fundamental part of their position 
coming out of the war. 
Foreign - Invasion 
The Israeli mass invasion of 1982 known as Operation Peace for Galilee was not 
the first time in which Israeli troops entered the country but is without a doubt the most 
consequential. The invasion lasted four months, culminating in a siege of the capital city, 
Beirut. Israeli troops would continue to occupy parts of Lebanon for the next eighteen 
years.102 1n terms of analyzing the ways in which the role of Palestinians in Lebanon is 
remembered, the operation is one of the most relevant events of the war. Because the 
invasion centered on the eradication of the PLO, it would later provide Maronite 
leadership yet another opportunity to brand the impact of refugees on the country. It is a 
prime example of the way in which Lebanese politicians use the Palestinian refugee 
question as a tool for furthering their own goals. 
On June 6 of 1982, the Israeli cabinet reported that they had instructed "The 
Israeli Defense Forces to place all the civilian population of the Galilee beyond the range 
of the terrorist fire from Lebanon, where they, their bases and their headquarters are 
c~ncentrated."'~~ In a clear reference to the PLO, the Israeli government initially claimed 
that the invasion was based purely on a need to secure the border against attacks. 
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However, just eight days later, a radio interview with then Defense Minister Ariel Sharon 
reveals that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) had continued north to take control of all 
roads leading to Beirut. He claimed that that this was because "the political infrastructure 
of the terrorist organizations is located in Beirut," yet insisted that the Israeli "aim in 
Beirut is not to alter the situation in Lebanon." The idea that the Israeli invasion was 
based purely on the objective of eliminating the threat of the PLO has become the 
dominant narrative, but is by no means the only explanation for the operation. 
There is considerable speculation among contemporary historical scholars such as 
Helena Cobban and Fawwaz Traboulsi, backed by a significant body of evidence, that the 
invasion was in part a setup to benefit the Maronite party in Lebanon, at the same time 
that Maronite leaders were holding the PLO responsible. Bashir Gemeyel, who led the 
earlier massacre at Tel al-Zaatar, had expressed an interest in the presidency as early as 
1976. This coincided perfectly with Israeli interests in installing a Lebanese president 
with anti-Palestinian leanings.'04 The idea of likely political motivation was brought up 
independently at the time by the Arab League. In a statement made later that month, they 
claimed "Contrary to declarations made by Israel that the invasion is for security 
reasons.. .Lebanon has been an Israeli political target for many years prior to the presence 
of the Palestinians in ~ebanon.""~ The Statement goes on to cite the 1955 diary of Israeli 
Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett: 
The only thing that's necessary is to find a Lebanese officer, even a major 
will do. We should either win his heart or buy him with money.. .Then the 
Israeli army will enter Lebanon, occupy the necessary territory and create 
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a Christian regime which will ally itself with ~srael . ' '~ 
The statement cited a similar diary entry from former Prime Minister Ben Gurion in 
1948, the very year the Israeli state was declared. The entries indicate that an invasion of 
Lebanon for political purposes had long been a goal within Israeli foreign policy. Peace 
for Galilee was not merely a reaction to PLO operations across the border. Yet it would 
be presented as such by Maronite leader Bashir Gemayel, contributing heavily to the way 
in which it would be remembered."" 
The allegations of political motivation leveled by the Arab League appear to be 
consistent with academic historical findings. According to Fawaz Traboulsi, author of A 
History of Modern Lebanon, Sharon envisioned a Lebanon that was primarily Christian, 
under the leadership of ~ e m a ~ e 1 . l ' ~  The actions of Gemayel himself make a case for the 
intersection of the Israeli invasion and internal Lebanese politics. When Druze leader 
Jumblatt accused him of attempting to profit from the invasion, he simply replied: "we 
can all profit from it."lo9 Indeed, Gemayel ran for president on an anti-alien platform, 
criticizing the convenient Israeli presence while simultaneously using it to direct 
accusations against Palestinians. In a speech announcing his candidacy for president, he 
stated: 
As for the armed Israeli presence, we consider it an alien presence. We all 
know how and why it came.. .and how often Phalanges statements and 
moves by the Lebanese front warned of the consequences that could result 
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from what the Palestinians were doing - and we got into the situation we are 
in now. This presence, along with the other alien armed presence in Lebanon, 
must come to an end. They must be terminated, and the sooner the better."' 
In direct fulfillment of proclaimed Israeli interests, Gemayel used the Israeli presence to 
his advantage in shaping the scope and frame of the election. The message is clear: 
Palestinians have brought foreign occupation upon us, while the Phalange party had 
already both foreseen and warned of this likelihood. When he finally attained the 
presidency, Jumblatt christened him the "candidate of the Israeli tanks." Traboulsi reveals 
that Gemayel's own campaign directors later acknowledged he obtained the quorum of 
62 parliamentary votes through "intimidation, terror, and buying MP's votes."' ' ' It is 
very possible that part of that intimidation and terror was the backing of Israeli troops. 
While Maronite leaders would blame the Palestinian presence and resistance for the 1982 
Israeli invasion, they were simultaneously benefiting from the occupation. 
While it is clear that the presence of Israeli troops in Lebanon is not simply a 
direct consequence of Palestinian combatants and their actions, this is one way it was 
initially portrayed. That development is no coincidence, but the result of concentrated 
efforts by leaders both in Lebanon and abroad. Bashir Gemayel himself made a statement 
to that effect as early as June 17. 
It [Israel] moved in to defend itself because it could not tolerate a Palestinian 
army at its doorstep. It tried diplomacy and contacts and when these failed, it 
occupied. It did say however that it had no intention of taking over one inch 
of Lebanese territory.' l2  
110 
"Press interview statements by Phalangist Party leader Gemayyel of Lebanon warning that the Israeli 
presence in Lebanon threatens its unity and rejecting armed Palestinian presence in the country, June 17, 
1982." Archive of the Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, Lebanon. 
' I 1  Ibid,215 
112 
"Press interview statements by Phalangist Party leader Gemayyel of Lebanon warning that the Israeli 
presence in Lebanon threatens its unity and rejecting armed Palestinian presence in the country, June 17, 
1982." Archive of the Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, Lebanon. 
In a firm departure from 'we can all profit from it,' Gemayel simultaneously lays the 
blame for the invasion squarely on the actions of Palestinians, identifies with the Israeli 
position, and seeks to dispel fear about the possible implications of the occupation. 
Statements exonerating Israel and citing Palestinian actions as the sole reason 
behind the invasion were also plentiful on an international level. The same day Gemayel 
released his statement, US Senator Edward Kennedy made a speech on the Senate floor 
saying 
In recent weeks, Israeli diplomats have been the victims of vicious 
assassination plots. Israeli towns and farms in Galilee have been the 
targets of indiscriminating rocket and artillery attacks by Palestinian 
terrorists in Lebanon. The people of Israeli live in constant harassment 
and fear for their lives. The result is the continuing outbreak of hostilities 
such as the conflict of the past 10 days. ' I 3  
Another Democratic Senator, Dennis Deconcini, went so far as to say "It is ludicrous to 
suggest that Israel is attacking a sovereign nation. There is very little reality to Lebanon 
as a political entity.. .little more than a base of operations for an international terrorist 
organization that should be eliminated."l14 These statements from across the world, 
indicting Palestinian actions as the sole motivation behind the Israeli 1982 operation, 
would have a profound effect on the ways in which it would be remembered. Popular 
blame directed against the action of Palestinians in Lebanon will later become a powerhl 
tool in denying refugees civil rights in their host country. 
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The potency of the invasion as a political weapon is bolstered by the ways in 
which the Lebanese population remembers the Israeli presence. Because it had such a 
strong effect on the lives of Lebanese citizens, creating a causal link between that 
situation and Palestinians is a powerful way to influence and shape public opinion. A 
month after the occupation, the Arab League released a statement condemning Israel's 
treafment of the civilian population in Lebanon. "The measures the Zionist occupation 
authorities are taking against the inhabitants of the territory they have occupied in 
Lebanon.. .constitute a flagrant violation of international pacts, the Geneva Conventions 
and the principles of human rights."'15 The statement is most likely in reference to an IDF 
siege of (primarily Sunni) West Beirut, ostensibly for the purpose of forcing the PLO 
from the country. The statement was released on July 8, shortly after Israeli officers 
enforced a shutdown of utilities in much of the city.'16 This was soon followed by the 
tight cutoff of medical supplies as IDF forces continued to bombard the population of 
West Beirut, trapped under near total siege117. Despite receiving a written pledge of 
withdrawal from Arafat, Sharon continued to bomb the population throughout the final 
negotiation period, firmly connecting memory of the siege conditions to the PLO 
presence." 
The PLO ExpeIled 
The departure of PLO from Lebanon, as a result of the Israeli siege, is the turning 
point of the Lebanese civil war with regard to Palestinian involvement. It marks the end 
115 
"Statement by Secretariat of the Arab League criticizing Israel's treatment of civilians in Lebanese 
territory occupied after its invasion, July 8, 1982." Archive of the Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 
Lebanon. 
116 Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon, 184 
' I 7  Ibid, 185 
Ibid 
of mass armed commando presence and the end of Lebanon as a major Palestinian 
staging ground against Israel. Because of the common presence of both noncombatant 
refugees and commandos in the early part of the war, it is difficult to isolate the actions 
of, and popular positions towards, the noncombatant refugee population. The way in 
which Palestinian refugees were treated in wake of the PLO departure is an indicator of 
their general reputation in Lebanese society, an image that would certainly shape their 
treatment post civil war. Here, I explore the ways in which the departure was portrayed, 
and the impact it had on the perception of Palestinians in Lebanon. 
Towards the end of June, almost a month into the invasion, Israel expanded its 
demands for the removal of the siege from around West Beirut. Initially seeking the 
departure or assassination of the PLO leadership, Israel now demanded that all PLO 
forces leave the country before the IDF would stand down."9 This demand was 
particularly troubling in the shadow of the Tel al-Zaatar siege, given that it ended with 
the massacre of hundreds of Palestinians, mostly  noncombatant^.'^^ In light of this, 
Palestinian hesitation at leaving the refugee population unprotected, at the mercy of 
Lebanese militias, is understandable. The situation created a telling dynamic whereby 
vulnerable refugees expressed apprehension toward their future safety and stability, as the 
Phalangist leadership blamed them for the plight of the country. Similar to the way in 
which Gemayel used this dynamic to further his political careeer; the approach would be 
employed by Christian parties after the war to preserve the Maronite dominated political 
system. 
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It was a complicated process by which the PLO leadership came to the decision to 
withdraw from West Beirut and Lebanon. According to Rashid Khalidi, author of Under 
Siege, it involved only a handful of men within the core PLO leadership, and hinged upon 
US alignment with the Israeli position.121 The PLO initially hoped for a UN intervention 
and ceasefire, similar to the conclusion of previous Arab-Israeli conflicts. However, US 
insistence that Israel was exercising a right of self defense ultimately tabled that 
possibility. The PLO leadership eventually agreed that a negotiated withdrawal was their 
only option.lZ2 
Throughout the process of planning the evacuation, Israeli representatives 
continued to emphasize a negative reputation of Palestinians in Lebanon, ignoring the 
effects of the Israeli invasion itself, support for commandos within the Lebanese 
population, and any distinctions between Palestinian commandos and noncombatants. 
While this is not surprising, it had a significant role in molding popular perceptions 
towards Palestinians in Lebanon. As the perpetrator of mass destruction in Lebanon, 
Israel and its representatives were in a clear position of authority regarding the reasons 
behind their presence. In claiming that Palestinian activity was at the forefront of those 
reasons, Israel was able to deflect blame and incriminate the PLO in one stroke. In an 
August 8 Interview, Israeli Ambassador to the US Moshe Arens claimed 
If the PLO maintains control of Beirut, as they have been in Beirut for the 
past seven years, this will lead to the continuation of the kind of bloodshed 
and killing that has been going on there for the past seven years. You know, 
100,000 Lebanese were killed during the past seven years.. .If it has not been 
for the Israeli action, if we don't manage to get the PLO out of Beirut, you'll 
have a continuation of that.'23 
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"Television interview statements by ambassador to the US Arens of Israel expressing doubt about the 
Ambassador Arens disregards the entire history of the buildup to the war, the complex 
sectarian politics that contributed to it, the fact that it began with a Phalangist massacre, 
blaming the entire episode on the presence of the PLO. By drawing on the devastating 
effects of the civil war and Israeli invasion, he reinforces anti-Palestinian sentiment 
within the country. Arens bolsters this claim by implying that PLO concerns over safety 
are directly related to guilt, ignoring the state of war that the country happens to be 
embroiled in. 
It's the PLO that was scared. And you know, they were scared primarily 
of the Lebanese, that the Lebanese would come in and beat them up and 
hurt them, because of the problems that they've had with the Lebanese 
and the great destruction that they wrought in ~ e b a n 0 n . l ~ ~  
Statements like this helped contribute to a negative perceptions and memories of 
Palestinians in Lebanon by creating the illusion that the issue of blame was a closed case. 
If the PLO could be portrayed as guilty, clearly they were responsible. In fact, the entire 
expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon turned into a process of framing Palestinian actions 
in Lebanon, contributing to their lasting reputation in the country. 
Sabra and Shatila 
The expulsion of the PLO from Beirut is an important event in any understanding 
of the Palestinian role and image in Lebanon, because it drastically reduced the militant 
Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Before 1982, it was difficult to differentiate between 
attitudes towards Palestinian militants and noncombatant refugees due to the presence of 
French objectives in the process of PLO's withdrawal from Beirut and explaining why Israel has besieged 
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both and common generalization between the two. After the expulsion of the PLO, it is 
much easier to isolate wartime attitudes towards the refugee population. 
An excellent example of broad and generalized treatment of Palestinians is a 1982 
press interview with Bashir Gemayyel, in which he says "the Palestinians in Lebanon 
were no longer Palestinians seeking to return to their land. They turned into agents and a 
fifth column."125 In addition to making the accusation that Palestinians in Lebanon sought 
permanent citizenship, Gemayel makes no distinction as to which Palestinians he is 
referring to, grouping them all into a single category. The manner in which Phalangist 
troops under his command massacred noncombatants at Tel al-Zaatar is a testament to 
that lack of distinction. Consequently, the subject of protection for the Palestinian refugee 
population constituted a large part of PLO demands for their withdrawal from Beirut. 
They sought US and international guarantees for protection from both Israeli and 
Phalangist reprisal.'26 It is clear that at this stage, the refugee population in Lebanon was 
in a vulnerable position with no reason to believe that they were immune to sectarian 
violence. 
Concerns over the fate of Palestinian refugees in the wake of PLO expulsion were 
confirmed on September 15, 1982 in the form the Sabra and Chatila massacre. Sabra and 
Chatila is without a doubt the single most telling example of anti-Palestinians sentiment 
in Lebanon. While Israeli troops have been found guilty under numerous forums for 
allowing the massacre to take place, Maronite militiamen were ultimately responsible for 
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killing Palestinian men, women, and ~h i1dren . l~~  The massacre of Sabra and Chatila was 
ultimately a sectarian act based on longtime resentment towards Palestinians in Lebanon, 
and a clear lack of any distinction between militant commandos and noncombatant 
refugees.128 
The day before the massacre, Bashir Gemayel was killed in a bomb explosion the 
source of which was linked at the time to a Syrian anti-Phalangist party. While 
Phalangists did not initially blame Palestinians, the Israeli Defense Forces put out the 
message that Palestinians had killed Gemayel and that Arafat had left 2,000 undercover 
commandos in ~ e i r u t .  129 Israeli troops moved in to take control of West Beirut, in 
violation of the PLO evacuation agreement and uncharacteristically unopposed by any of 
the 2,000 commandos that were supposed to have remained."' However, the allegation 
that these commandos existed provided the pretext for Sharon and the IDF to allow 
Phalangist militants into the camps, led by Elias Hobeika, one of the men responsible for 
the 1976 Tel al-Zaatar   ass acre.'^^ While a great deal has been written about the extent 
to which the Israeli troops, Israeli government, and Phalange militia are responsible for 
the bloodbath, the purpose of this section is to unravel how the massacre demonstrates 
the degree of hatred towards Palestinians in Lebanon, foreshadowing the harsh treatment 
that they would endure with the conclusion of the civil war. 
The horrors of Sabra and Chatila can only be truly described by the refugees that 
faced them. Souad Merii, a resident of Shatila camp recalls her experience of the 
massacre thirteen years later: 
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We saw 13 armed men outside our door.. .They took the money we had - 
LL 40,0001- - and all our rings, even my father's wedding ring. One of them 
shouted and gave an order to take us inside the room. He ordered us to stand 
up by the wall with our hands raised above our heads, with our backs towards 
them.. .They started shooting us. My baby sister was shot in her head, and her 
brains splattered over us. My father was shot in his heart, but was still alive. 
My brothers Shadi, 3, Farid 8, Bassam 11, and my sisters Hajar, 7, and Shadia, 
and our neighbor died right away.. .As for me I was paralyzed right away and I 
couldn't move. The soldiers thought that we were all dead and left our house.132 
Merii's statement is backed up by a mountain of evidence including the final report of the 
Israeli Commission of Inquiry which stated "all the evidence indicates that the massacre 
9 ,  133 was perpetrated by the Phalangists. The Maronite troops were clearly not after 
sleeper PLO fighters hiding out in the camps. The widespread looting and indiscriminate 
slaughter of men, women and children is a violent reminder of the rage that certain 
parties in Lebanon felt towards the Palestinian presence. 
What is of particular interest to the study of memory and blame in the Lebanese 
civil war, is that Maronite Parties in Lebanon have been able to overcome the shadow of 
the massacre, and retain support for a political position against the rights of refugees in 
Lebanon. This is largely a result of widespread attempts to pin direct blame for the 
massacre on Israel, as the traditional Arab enemy, while ignoring the intra-Lebanese 
sectarian bloodshed that actually took place. The Arab League released a statement in a 
September 21 emergency session in which they asserted: "this hideous crime committed 
by the invading Israeli forces against the Lebanese and the Palestinian camps in Beirut 
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with the aim of liquidating the Palestinian people and tearing the unity of ~ebanon." ' )~ 
Some documents excluded the role of the Phalangists completely. An excerpt from Soviet 
News on September 22 read: 
Israel has committed a heinous crime. After the Palestinian armed forces 
pulled out from West Beirut, the Israeli troops treacherously forced their 
way into the city and carried out a massacre of Palestinian and Lebanese 
~ivi1ians.l)~ 
This position was backed up in Lebanon by Bashir Gemayel's brother, Amin, two days 
later. In an article written for the Washington Post, he condemns 
in the strongest possible terns the massacre of unarmed Palestinian civilians 
that occurred at the refugee camps last week. The Kataeb (Phalangist) party 
has always stood for deeply held Lebanese values of human justice, human 
rights and peace. This human tragedy, with which the Kataeb and its members 
had absolutely no involvement or association, makes it imperative that there 
emerge a strong central government.'36 
Gemayel would go on to become the next president of ~eban0n . l )~  Through widespread 
statements and opinions in this vein, the Kataeb party would exonerate itself while 
retaining the necessary political influence and support to continue its campaign against 
Palestinian rights in Lebanon. 
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The War of the Camps 
The final episode of the Lebanese civil war that is highly relevant to the 
Palestinian presence is the 1984-9 War of the Camps. The battle took place between 
Shiite militia and whatever militant presence was left in Lebanon. Shiites in Lebanon 
reacted to the thug-like behavior of Palestinian militants, but also to years of 
marginalization within a Sunni-Maronite dominated political system, bearing the brunt of 
Israeli retaliatory attacks in the Lebanese South. These reasons, alongside the continual 
branding of Palestinians in Lebanon as the root of violence, contributed to the five year 
long battle.138 In a sign of their dwindling reputation, Palestinians in Lebanon were now 
the target of Shiites as well as Lebanese Maronites. 
One fighter from the Shiite militia Amal (Hope), summed up the anti-Palestinian 
sentiment during the interrogation of Palestinian schoolteacher accused of being a 
combatant. "We are going to step on you Palestinians and Sunnis.. .What luck to have the 
chance to kill a ~alestinian!"'~~ As with previous stages of the war, and in an indicator of 
postwar policy, refugee noncombatants were given no amnesty, but were obliged to pay 
for the poor reputation of Palestinians in Lebanon. Amal besieged a number of camps, 
ensuring that no resident would be able to obtain fresh food. 
There's a martyr's family, very poor, they got hold of a tin of sardines four years 
past its expiry date. The whole family ate from it, without bread. All were 
poisoned and had to be taken to hospital. A short while after they were taken 
again to the hospital suffering from hunger. They had nothing. There were 
many families like that.l4' 
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The fact that multiple sects were now aligned against Palestinians in Lebanon is a clear 
indicator of the affects of the war on their public image and standing within the country. 
Furthermore, by subjecting entire camps to siege and bombardment, the Shiite militants 
convey the clear message that there is no distinction to be made between whether or not 
targeted refugees are combatants or not. All Palestinians pay the price of their presence in 
Lebanon. 
The Consequences of Reconciliation 
With some violent exceptions, the fifteen year Lebanese Civil War ended with the 
Ta'if Accord of 1989. Negotiated in Saudi Arabia, the accord outlined the internal 
conditions for peace. It adjusted the sectarian quotas of the national pact to ones intended 
to achieve political balance between the broad categories of Christian and Muslim. 
According to Joseph Malia, author of The Ta '$Accord: An Evaluation, the document 
drew from previous pacts and agreements that entrenched internal divides in Lebanon by 
reaffirming its sectarian nature.14' Its only reference to Palestinians is a firm rejection of 
repatriation within the country.'42 While it does constitute an attempt to deal with the 
issues that contributed to the civil war, the accord set up an environment that would 
facilitate the continued blame of Palestinians for the civil war 
The Ta'if Accord neglects to deal with the issue of Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon other than to forbid their naturalization there. In Peace for Lebanon, Deirdre 
Collings claims that it preserved the sectarian system that contributed to political and 
military imbalances in Lebanon, while simultaneously failing to deal with the refugee 
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population that was held largely responsible for the outbreak of war. The accord perfectly 
preserved the unstable situation that characterized Lebanon before the civil war. It lacks 
any provision for the protection of refugees in the country, creating a situation whereby 
the improvement of civil rights for Palestinians was highly unlikely.14) 
Alongside a neglect of Palestinian rights or protections, the Ta'if Accord insists 
upon the immediate disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, a clause applied 
enthusiastically to the Palestinian camps. Section A of the one-year plan states: 
"Disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be announced. The militias' 
weapons shall be delivered to the State of Lebanon within a period of 6 months."144 For a 
population that has already faced multiple massacres, the loss of all heavy and medium 
weaponry rendered them once again exceedingly vulnerable in their host country.'45 
According to Rex Brynen in Palestinian-Lebanese Political Relations, the Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon are the perfect "common targets for Lebanese blame in an emerging 
revisionist historical memory" and "a scapegoat upon which most of the responsibility of 
the war can be placed."146 The position of refugees in Lebanon depended on a number of 
factors, including widespread blame of Palestinians for the Civil War, their increased 
vulnerability in post-Ta7if Lebanon, and the preservation of the sectarian political system 
O and thus the settlement threat. This ensured that refugees in the postwar time period were 
collectively worse off in terms of political or popular standing and no closer to achieving 
civil or human rights. 
- 
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Cha~ter 3: Memorv and Aftermath 
Palestinian involvement in the Lebanese civil war and the ways in which it is 
remembered had a devastating impact on the position of refugees within the country. The 
country emerged from the war in an almost united front against Palestinian rights, in stark 
contrast to the polarizing role that refugees played in the buildup to civil strife. While this 
disparity is preserved in primary accounts and historical scholarship, it does not 
necessarily reflect a typical Lebanese position in the 1990s where the majority of the 
population would simply not have empathized with the position of refugees. There is a 
clear and dramatic shift between popular perceptions of Palestinians in Lebanon before 
and after the civil war. The Cairo Agreement was abrogated in 1990. Since then, 
prospects for Palestinian rights in Lebanon have d ~ i n d 1 e d . l ~ ~  While certain factions and 
sects supported Palestinian positions in the prewar years, this was certainly not the case 
after in post-Ta'if Lebanon. 
Sunni Muslims, initially supportive of potential sectarian allies, now sought to 
distance the~nselves from a population widely remembered as the cause of the war. 
According to Salim el-Hoss in Prospective Changes in Lebanon, having secured 
constitutional reforms that limited Maronite governmental power, the Sunni politicians 
had little incentive to M h e r  endanger their public image through continued association 
with ~a1estinians.l~~ In 1998, Sunni Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri stated that "Lebanon 
will never, ever integrate Palestinians. They will not receive civic or economic rights, or 
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even work permits."'49 Despite the fact that the granting of civil rights does not imply 
naturalization, it was presented as a direct path to citizenship. As had been the case 
before the war, the dreaded specter of tawteen was used to justify treatment of refugees, 
now paired with a narrative that held Palestinians accountable for the civil war. 
Nationalization of Palestinians in Lebanon would serve Lebanese Sunnis more than the 
Palestinians themselves, as it might impede their claim to a right of return. That the 
senior Sunni representative in Lebanon spoke out against Palestinian rights is a clear 
indicator of their public liability. 
In a similar development, other sect leaders took up parallel positions. The early 
disintegration of Shiite-Palestinian relations is evident from the 1984 War of the camps. 
However, after the Ta'if Accord, distinct parliamentary representation ensured that 
Shiites now had a sizable stake in the government, and thus, in the preservation of the 
sectarian system to which the Palestinian presence was a threat.150 Meanwhile, a shift in 
the Druze position was evident as early as 1988, when Druze Leader Walid Jumblat said 
Arafat's dreams of establishing a Palestinian canton in southern Lebanon 
are ridiculous and detrimental to the Palestinian and Lebanese issues.. .The 
current troubles being fomented by Arafat are a plot against the Lebanese 
Patriots and Syria and a service to [Christian Leaders] Samir Ja'ja, Michael 
Awn and 1srael.15' 
The statement is in stark contrast to one made by Jumblat's father before the civil war, 
when he claimed that Palestinian militants in Lebanon behaved like angels. In addition to 
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continued animosity from Maronite politicians, Palestinians had now lost the support of 
Sunni, Shiite and Druze sects. 
While political stances can be a good indicator of sectarian positions in Lebanon, 
they do not speak for the entire population. In a 199 1' survey documented by Rosemary 
Sayigh in Palestinians in Lebanon, 75% of the sample population opposed permanent 
settlement. While it is no surprise that 87% of Maronites would oppose settlement, a full 
63% of Sunnis opposed any naturalization of the population that held the potential to 
create a Sunni majority in Lebanon. More significantly, 40% of the overall sample 
favored actual military action to prevent settlement."? That fact that such a large portion 
of the population would favor armed action against a refugee population is a dual 
indicator of both Palestinian popularity as well as refugee vulnerability following the 
war. 
Postwar Survival 
In the aftermath of the civil war, the preservation of Lebanese unity and the 
revised sectarian political system demanded the continued ostracizing of Palestinian 
refugees. Building upon established blame of Palestinians for the war, an unsympathetic 
government portrayed refugees in Lebanon as a continued security threat, despite the 
post-Ta'if disarmament of remaining Palestinian militias. In Palestinians in Lebanon, 
Jihane Sfeir claims that "more than ever before, the figure of the Palestinian is needed in 
Lebanon ... The enemy within becomes the most significant element in constituting 
collective identity."153 By branding refugee camps as dangerous security threats, Lebanon 
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preserves the Palestinian specter while simultaneously constructing a pretext for the 
further deterioration of camp conditions in the post war years. 
In addition to the continued threat refugees posed to the sectarian political system, 
in-fighting within the camps enabled their portrayal as dangerous security islands beyond 
the reach of law. According to independent researcher Jaber Suleiman, this conception is 
false, as Lebanese security forces do in fact enter the refugee camps on occasion. 
However it paves the way for the continued attribution of Lebanese conflict to the 
Palestinian presence. For example, following the assassination of four Lebanese judges in 
1999, Shakir Abu Sulayman of the Maronite League immediately stated that "what 
happened in Sidon was the result of the existence of security islands that lay outside the 
authority of the state," a sentiment that was echoed in the Lebanese Press. 'j4 Despite 
warnings from the president against jumping to conclusions and accusations, prominent 
journalist Jibran Tuwayni wrote 
We do not intend to accuse the Palestinians of the massacre in Sidon 
before the investigation has ended. But the mere presence of Palestinian 
camps outside the authority of the state, with their weaponry and armed 
elements, naturally leads on to point fingers at the prime cause behind 
the security disorder.'j5 
In the excerpt, Tuwayni contradicts himself by endorsing the very accusation that he 
purports to discourage. The portrayal of the refugee camps as dangerous security islands 
by the Maronite leadership and the Lebanese press sets Palestinians up as a legitimate 
target of blame for conflict in Lebanon. 
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The notion of the lawless Palestinian camp in postwar Lebanon is a direct 
consequence of Lebanese government policy and purpose. Its existence should not be 
taken for granted or treated as an inherent part of the situation. A common understanding 
of camp security is demonstrated in a 2002 report by the Council of the European, 
"Palestinians can therefore almost entirely elude the control of the Lebanese authorities 
inside the camps. The Lebanese authorities do not intervene in conflicts and problems 
between Palestinians in the camps either."'j6 This type of fatalist analysis fails to 
examine the factors that resulted in the camp security situation, and thus contribute to 
negative portrayals of Palestinians in Lebanon. In Palestinian Refugee Camps in 
Lebanon: Laboratory of Indocile Identity Formation, sociologist Sari Hanafi traces 
security situations in the camps to the fact that they are closed spaces, on "the urban 
periphery, lacking in green spaces, and with poor access and poor housing."'j7 This 
facilitates the ability of the host country to classify them as states of exception. Hanafi 
argues that the Lebanese government has "abandoned the camps and allowed them to 
become spaces devoid of laws and regulations."'58 While this system functioned to a 
certain extent before 1982, the expulsion of the PLO created a power vacuum in camp 
governance. While Maronite leaders brand the refugee camps as lawless and dangerous 
security islands, a senior officer in the Lebanese security forces stated that the "camps are 
not under the responsibility of the Lebanese The statement absolves Lebanon 
from any accountability with regard to the Palestinian refugees, while actively removing 
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the camps from Lebanese jurisdiction. In the interest of national unity, the Lebanese 
government actively ensured that the refugee camps would not gain stability, so as to 
retain the Palestinian threat as a scapegoat for Lebanese conflict. 
The aftermath of a civil war from which Palestinians emerged hated and blamed 
did not provide an opportune climate for the improvement of refugee conditions in 
Lebanon. As noted by Deirdre Collings, a common opposition to any re-establishment of 
Palestinian power emerged in post-Ta'if ~eban0n . l~ '  The continued threat of Palestinian 
militarism was used by the government, alongside the specter of permanent settlement, to 
justify appalling conditions for refugees in Lebanon. While the deplorable restrictions on 
Palestinian human and civil rights would be presented as a necessary measure to forestall 
nationalization, the connection between improved conditions and citizenship is feeble. 
The more compelling conclusion is that severe living conditions provided a means of 
control over the refugee population. 
In post-Ta'if Lebanon, all aspects of refugees' lives were regulated, including 
health, education, employment, property, and movement. The restrictions were put in 
place specifically for the purpose of deteriorate living conditions. In Palestinians in 
Lebanon: The Birth of the "Enemy Within, "Jihane Sfeir writes: "With the end of the 
Civil War in 199 1, the Palestinian community was considered a convenient scapegoat for 
the war in Lebanon. In the post-civil war era, restrictions ... in the camps were taken to 
 extreme^."'^' Sfeir claims the Lebanese rational is that integration in Lebanon would 
render refugees ineligible for aid from UNRWA. Even if there were a link between 
improved conditions and naturalization, this is clearly not the case. Integration does not 
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violate UNRWA's very precise definition of Palestinian refugees, as descendents of 
"people whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 
1948, who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab- 
Israeli conflict."162 Additionally, this position fails to take into account the severe absence 
of camp jobs following the expulsion of PLO and PLO funding, as well as the inability of 
the UN agency to cope with the refugee crises. 
The severity of camp conditions and insufficiency of UNRWA are examined in 
Rosemary Sayigh's Palestinians in Lebanon: Harsh Present, Uncertain Future. 
Regarding health, Sayigh reveals that "UNRWA's subsidies for hospital treatment now 
cover two thirds of the cost of a hospital bed only-not doctor's fees, tests, or 
treatment.. .Low-income Palestinians who need surgery have to beg or die. ,7163 ne 
deterioration of medical support is confirmed by a 2001 report by the Institute for 
Palestine Studies, which claimed that "between 1989 and 1995, the number of hospital 
beds available for Palestinians in Lebanon decreased by over half, from 0.56 beds to 0.25 
beds per 1000 [refugees]."'64 The dates cited in the report are particularly relevant 
because they identi@ the discrepancy, or significant drop in care and options, between 
the end of the civil war and the post Ta'if years. The deteriorating health situation is a 
reflection of camp living conditions, a lack of any substantial UNRWA support, and the 
drastic need for improved rights for Palestinians. 
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Vulnerability 
The civil war held particularly severe consequences for vulnerable groups of 
refugees, such as children, women, and non-ID refugees. In the post war years, children 
suffered from abysmal health conditions, a lack of education, and, as a result of labor 
restrictions, no incentive to pursue what education was available. They continue to grow 
up unwelcome and deprived. Similarly, a large percentage of women in the postwar 
camps faced health complications. This was commonly compounded by the loss of a 
husband and father to the war, leaving women to single handedly support a family with 
sparse employment prospects or aid. Another group of Palestinians particularly 
vulnerable in post war Lebanon are known as non-ID refugees. The term refers to 
refugees that lack documentation, and are thus ineligible for UNRWA assistance. 
Because of Lebanese policy towards Palestinian in the post-Ta'if era, conditions for these 
groups of refugees were particularly harsh. 
While it is difficult to determine the exact impact that conditions in Lebanon have 
had on the development of children after the civil war, a combination of oral history and 
statistics can begin to provide a reliable picture. According to a 2001 report from the 
Institute of Palestine Studies, 21 percent of Palestinians between the ages of 7 and 18 are 
not enrolled in scho01s.l~~ When compared to neighboring host countries, dropout rates in 
Lebanese UNRWA schools are almost double. In Palestinians in Lebanon: Uncertain 
Future, Rosemary Sayigh pinpoints the dropout rate at 36.6 percent, as compared to a 6.2 
percent rate in 1978 during the early years of the war.166 These figures illustrate the 
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difficult conditions in which child refugees grew up after the war. Additionally, they 
reveal the extent to which these issues are particular to Lebanon. 
The situation described in the IPS report indicates adverse living situations 
substantiated by the children themselves. In 1998, Mayssoun Sukarieh, a volunteer 
teacher in the Shatila camp and graduate student at the American University of Beirut, 
worked with students between the ages of twelve and fifteen to document their 
experiences and outlook. The testimonies attribute the low enrollment and high dropout 
rates to a combination of bleak future prospects and the need to help support family. One 
student, Muhammad Daud explains the impact of the labor restrictions on their lives and 
the way in which they view education: "Even if I finish school, the fact that I'm 
Palestinian means that I'll be a house painter, baker, garbage collector, electrician, or 
me~hanic . " '~~  According to Ahmad Abu Shelleyh and Walid Balkis, this fate is 
reinforced by the teachers themselves, who encourage student dropouts and instill a 
fatalistic outlook towards future possibilities. 
He [The teacher] uses all kinds of abusive language. He has a nickname for 
each of us: "garbage man," "thief," "house painter," and so on. Thanks, 
teacher, for reminding us where our future lies. If the teacher sends one of us 
to the principle.. .[he] advises us to leave school and work as a blacksmith, 
electricians, or garbage collector (for boys) and as a seamstress, or 
hairdresser, or domestic servant (for girls). . .Sometimes I wonder Why [sic] 
do the Lebanese even bother to prevent us from practicing certain professions 
like medicine, engineering, and low in addition to seventy-three other 
occupations? After all, Jericho School can only produce garbagemen [sic], house 
painters and  blacksmith^.'^^ 
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The deploring standards of education within the camps clearly had a strong detrimental 
impact on the motivations of students to stay in school, as well as their future outlook. As 
a result, many disheartened students dropped out of school. In Palestinians in Lebanon, 
Sayigh notes the particular "demoralization of adolescent boys, mostly out of school, 
without training programs, and unemployed."'69 Palestinians experienced a significant 
drop in both the availability of adequate education, as well as a drop in the viability and 
relevance of education itself, heavily influenced by the lack of available jobs. 
A deteriorating quality of life also seriously shaped the way in which Palestinian 
children and youth viewed their own refugee identity within the Lebanese state. Shatila 
students Mariam Azzouka and Usama Abu al-Shayekh explore the consequences of their 
surroundings on their Palestinian identity: 
This identity of ours brings us nothing but trouble.. .What can we belong to 
in Shatila? To the garbage? Or to the alleyways that stink of sewage? Why 
should we belong to Shatila? ... In Shatila we're not treated like people, and 
we have no future. So we don't carry the identity of the place we live in, 
and the identity we carry has no place.'70 
The statement clearly indicates the extent to which camp conditions contributed to the 
development of identity among Palestinian children and the effect of Lebanese 
restrictions on their feelings of self worth. 
Healthcare is another area in which camp conditions are unacceptably poor. A 
total of 9% of refugees between the ages of 1-3 are categorized as "vulnerable children," 
compared to 2% in Jordan. This constitutes a callous state of affairs, as there is only one 
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UNRWA doctor for every 10,000 rehgees and only one hospital bed for every 4 0 0 0 . ' ~ ~  
The Shatila interviews indicate that this reality had similar adverse affects on children. In 
a statement entitled I n  the Camps, We Die of Minor Illnesses, Wissam al-Ahmad wrote 
Two years ago my brother got asthma, which affects many people in the camps 
because of the unhygienic conditions and the very humid houses, as well as the 
stench of garbage and sewage. In most places, asthma isn't a serious disease.. . 
But my brother dies of asthma. Why? Because we could only treat him at the 
clinics reserved for the Palestinian people.'72 
In the post Ta'if climate, Palestinian children suffered greatly from the Lebanese position 
on refugees. Their education was not a priority, their lives not worth saving. 
Palestinian women are another group of refhgees that suffered particularly 
difficult conditions after the civil war. Because of the large number of husbands and 
fathers who were killed or imprisoned during the civil war, a disproportionate number of 
widowed women bear the entire responsibility of raising a family. In The Case of 
Lebanon, Hala Maksoud writes that women were under "tremendous pressure" in the 
post war years, suddenly responsible for the well being of their families with virtually no 
resources or support.173 This enabled them to defy traditionally defined gender roles that 
limited women to the domestic sphere, evidenced by an increase in employment among 
female refugees174. But the need to find work outside the camps left many children absent 
both parents, reinforcing the difficult conditions children were experiencing. 
171 Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, (Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001). 
172 Wissam al-Ahmad, "Through Children's Eyes: Children's Rights in Shatila Camp" ed. Mayssoun 
Sukarieh, Journal of Palestine Studies 24 no. 1 (1999), 55. 
173 Hala Maksoud, "The Case of Lebanon," in Arab Women: Between DeJiance and Restraint, ed. Suha 
Sabbagh (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1996), 96. 
74 Ibid. 
Women also experienced an upsurge in health issues in the aftermath of the war. 
In Palestinians in Lebanon, Sayigh found that stress related conditions were particularly 
common among mothers. Heart abnormalities, asthma, diabetes, insomnia, and kidney 
and thyroid problems were all common, a possible result of sudden increases of pressure 
and responsibility.'75 The testimony of Fayza 'Adas illustrates the hardship that refugees 
in Lebanon experienced in wake of the civil war. While 'Adas is originally Lebanese, she 
married a Palestinian, lives in Burj a1 Barajneh camp, and says "I feel Palestinian in my 
blood." After her husband died in the civil war, she described the camp living conditions 
in 1994: 
UNRWA has cut off its services, the PLO is no longer paying the small sums 
it used to allocate to the families of martyrs. Our family for example hasn't 
received anything for eleven months. Plus, I am not well - high blood pressure, 
kidney problems, swollen glands, a slipped disk, and hardening of the arteries.'76 
The testimony illustrates what many women in the camps were experiencing after the 
war. Alone and without support, 'Adas struggled with supporting a family and her own 
health issues, some of which may have arisen from that pressure. Both of these conditions 
would have been greatly alleviated with any support from the host country. Instead, she is 
faced with a state policy specifically designed to keep her in a position of subordination 
and destitution. 
A testament of the extent to which this situation has been ignored is the eerie lack 
of historical scholarship covering Palestinian women in Lebanon. Though they do appear 
in the work of such authors as Hala Maksound and Rosemary Sayigh, this is by no means 
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the norm. More commonly, relevant books such as Arab and From Patriarchy 
to ~rn~owerrnen t '~~  dedicate sections to women in both Lebanon and Palestine, but barely 
touch on the case of Palestinian women in Lebanon. That absence suggests widespread 
neglect of the situation, further evidence for the difficult predicament of Palestinian 
women in Lebanon. 
Non-ID refugees are the third major group of refugees that suffer particular 
vulnerability in post-Ta'if Lebanon. According to a report by the Danish refugee council, 
3000 Palestinian refugees were still without identification papers in 2007. They entered 
Lebanon primarily in the early 1970s as a result of the Black September expulsions of 
Palestinians from Jordan. As they country was descending into civil war, they relied on 
PLO protection and never registered.179 With the 1982 PLO expulsion, and the 
subsequent end to the civil war, they are stranded in a country where they have no 
standing as either residents or refugees. They cannot function within Lebanese society, 
but are simultaneously unable to benefit from refugee support such as UNRWA health, 
education, and nutrition services. Until Lebanon recognizes the plight of the population 
living within its borders, non ID refugees will continue to occupy a liminal space, 
deprived of rights or protection. 
Law and Restriction 
The postwar employment prospects are some of the most consequential for 
refugees in Lebanon, as they determine income, quality of life, and importance of 
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education. The two primary factors impact the labor situation in postwar Lebanon are the 
retention of pre-war exclusionist labor laws, and the disappearance of many camp jobs 
with the expulsion of the PLO. In Palestinians in Lebanon, Sayigh claims "If by 
'employment' is meant salaried, contract-regulated work (with notice, pension, and 
accident insurance), the figure of 90 percent unemployment.. .is justified, since few but 
UNRWA employees enjoy this s i t~at ion." '~~ Poor employment prospects have 
contributed to a decline in education among refugees in the wake of the civil war. 
According to Sayigh, Lebanon is alone among Palestinians host countries with a rising 
illiteracy rate among refugees.18' The impact of the job market on education is reflected 
in the testimony of refugees themselves. Abir 'Adnan 'Adas of Burj al-Barajneh camp 
describes the situation in 1994: 
UNRWA's.. .department of social affairs suspended the aid we were receiving 
on the grounds that my 17-year-old brother had completed a blacksmith training 
course at the "Orphans House" in Beirut and that he therefore has a profession. 
What they didn't take into account is that he's been unemployed since the course 
ended. We have all stopped our studies because we don't have the rneans.ls2 
'Adas' account illustrates the casual link between the lack of jobs and disenchantment 
with education. This is reinforced by his mother, Fayza, who claimed "the education of 
our youth is wasted. Our university graduates are forced to work as masons."'83 By 
retaining strict labor restrictions in the post war environment, the Lebanese government 
condemned refugees to the deteriorating conditions of the post-Ta'if era, without the 
prospect of class mobility through work or education. 
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The postwar conditions endured by refugees were the direct result of legislation 
specifically designed to prevent Palestinians in Lebanon from achieving any measure of 
power in the country. The legislation is based in the post Ta'if transformation of the 
"Palestinian cause" into the "Palestinian Problem." According to Zeina Halabi and the 
Centre for Comparative Studies of Law and Society, the laws are designed to expedite 
repatriation through the belief that any improvement in living conditions will be 
interpreted by Israel as a weakened argument for the right to return. But even as Halabi 
acknowledges that this translates into "legal and political discrimination," she 
simultaneously demonstrates the Lebanese postwar mentality by grouping all Palestinians 
into one category with such comments as "the Palestinians, whose pivotal role in the civil 
war was ~ndeniable ." '~~ While Palestinians in Lebanon undoubtedly played a role in the 
civil war, these statements and generalizations single them out for blame, and blatantly 
ignore distinctions between Palestinians in the country. It neglects a noncombatant 
refugee population that suffered heavily in the war, and reinforces the vague conception 
of a faceless Palestinian threat that can be attributed to the entire refugee population. 
Because of the way in which civil rights have been connected to eventual 
settlement, the anti-nationalization stance taken in the Ta7if accord has structurally 
cemented refugee conditions. In Palestinians in Lebanon, Sayigh claims that there is no 
umbrella legal system that governs refugees in the Instead, they are subject to 
a series of ad hoc government decisions. She has documented a series of post-war vetoes 
against reconstruction of destroyed camps, the establishment of any new camps, and 
against expanding camps, ensuring that refugees would continue to occupy the same 
184 Zeina Halabi, "Exclusion and Identity in Lebanon's Palestinian Refugee Camps: a story of sustained 
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overcrowded spaces despite population growth.'g6 In the post war political climate, the 
legal decisions governing refugees became increasingly discriminatory. 
Post Ta'if amendments targeted Palestinians specifically, singling them out for 
substandard rights and conditions. A prime example of this is law 296 which forbids the 
ownership of property by Palestinians. Article 11 of the Lebanese Law of ownership 
states that "real property ownership is the right to use, enjoy and dispose of a certain 
property within the limits of the laws, decrees and regulations."187 Law 296 of 2001 is 
one such exception, stating that "it is not permissible to have any real estate property, by 
any person who is not carrying a nationality from a recognized state, or by any person if 
the property is contradictory with the constitutional precepts."'g8 Palestinians, as stateless 
refugees, have no recognized nationality, and so are unable to own property under the 
law. Furthermore, according to Jaber Suleiman, the mention of constitutional precepts 
refers to the post-Ta'if amendment against the permanent settlement of refugees in 
Lebanon. The law not only forbids the acquisition of new property, but renders any 
existing property ownership illegal. It is clearly aimed at Palestinians in Lebanon, and is 
particularly troubling given the context of a diminished number of camps and legislation 
against camp expansion or repair.lg9 
A second area in which Palestinian rights were curtailed in the wake of the civil 
war is Lebanese Labor law. Palestinian workers rights in Lebanon have always been 
compromised by the principle of reciprocity. Employment eligibility for many jobs in 
Lebanon was determined by whether or not foreign workers' countries allowed Lebanese 
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nationals to occupy those positions. Palestinians, as stateless refugees, slipped through 
the cracks of this law, as they did not have a state that could grant reciprocity. According 
to Human Rights Center Executive manager Suheil Al-Natour, conditions deteriorated 
since the civil war. A 1993 decree added such lower income positions as teachers, 
waiters, and drivers to the list. In 1995, an ordinance introduced by Minister Asad Hardan 
added construction, agriculture, metalworking, and domestic labor to the list of restricted 
occupations.190 There are some exceptions to the restrictions, and Lebanese labor law 
does not include low income service jobs. But by and large, Palestinian workers in 
Lebanon face overwhelming odds when seeking work. Between housing and 
employment, post war legislation effectively crippled the lives of refugees in the country. 
State Security 
The Lebanese policy abandoning the refugee camps to their own devices is 
detrimental to Lebanese-Palestinian relations, and also constitutes a threat to the security 
of the host country. The government refuses to take any responsibility for the camps in an 
attempt to keep them ostracized from Lebanese society and discourage integration.lgl But 
this reinforces the reputation of the camps as security islands and off-the-grid havens. 
The resultant migration of outsiders into the camps serves to further taint their reputation 
within Lebanese society, but also creates a security predicament that might actually be 
solved through a reversal of government policy. As such, it would be well within 
Lebanese interests to take formal responsibility for the camps. 
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In Exclusion and Identity in Lebanon's Palestian Refugee Camps, Zeina Halabi 
argues that Palestinians in Shatila camp now claim that they are in the minority. While 
their estimate of 70% "outsiders" is likely inflated, it does demonstrate that Palestinians 
feel a strong presence from other groups, to the extent that it has become a point of 
t e n ~ i 0 n . l ~ ~  This outside presence is a direct result of a Lebanese policy of neglect, and has 
had serious consequences for the reputation of the camps as well as Lebanese security. 
The adverse impact of outsiders in refugee camps is best demonstrated by the 
Nahr el-Bared incident of 2007. Nahr el-Bared, home to 35,000 refugees, was totally 
demolished by the Lebanese army in a 104 day battle. In a 2010 article, Ismael Sheikh 
Hassan and Sari Hanafi confirm that the antagonists were not local camp residents, but 
Fatah al-Islam, "an Islamist fundamentalist group, predominantly foreign, that had 
implanted itself in the camp only six months earlier."19' A 2007 article in the Lebanese 
newspaper The Daily Star entitled "Stigma of summer fighting adds to discrimination 
facing Palestinians" explores the ways in which the fighting increased negative 
perceptions of the camps. "The Lebanese Army and the Internal Security Forces are 
basically looking upon Palestinians as a Threat.. .Many Lebanese blame the Palestinians 
for allowing Fatah al-Islam into Nahr a l - ~ a r e d . " ' ~ ~  The Nahr al-Bared incident 
demonstrates the serious problems surrounding the camps and the ways in which they are 
perceived. That said, it also provides an opportunity and impetus for the government to 
take on a measure of responsibility for the refugee population in Lebanon. 
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Conclusion 
As Michel-Rolph Trouillot claims in Silencing the Past, historical events are a 
position, not an absolute.'95 Palestinians in Lebanon are widely remembered as faceless 
violent agitators that drew the country into fifteen years of devastating civil war. 
Following the end of the war in 1990, the government portrayed their camps as 
dangerous security islands beyond the reach of law, a continued threat to the state. But 
this narrative reflects a highly politicized position and a clear incentive to ossify the 
negative reputation of refugees in the country. Oral histories, political speeches, 
interviews, newspaper articles, and historical scholarship present an alternate narrative. 
Palestinians refugees fled to Lebanon seeking temporary haven from war and 
occupation, without plans for permanent settlement or armed conflict. Yet they arrived in 
an unstable, newly independent country, one that still reeled from the clutches of 
colonialism. A country deeply divided along lines of religion and class, where their very 
presence was perceived as a potential threat to state security. The majority of refugees 
faced discrimination, confinement, unemployment, and constant vulnerability, enforced 
by a government seeking to suspend them in a position of subordination. Given this 
treatment, it is unremarkable that refugees leapt at the chance for a measure of autonomy 
with the arrival of the PLO in 1971. 
While Palestinian actions in Lebanon, including border raids against Israel, 
certainly had an impact on stability within the country, the controversy that they sparked 
was primarily the result of uncovered sectarian tension. Lebanon was already mired in 
internal conflict and division under an ineffective government, and in no position to 
' 9 5  Trouillot, Silencing the Past, 15 .  
support a refugee population. The Lebanese civil war was a result of a divided country 
and dysfunctional political system, not the actions of an oppressed refugee population. 
Yet the event served as a pivotal impetus, shifting the public perception and memory of 
refugees as victims to a role of violent instigators. 
It is no accident that post-Ta7if governments have capitalized on public blame of 
Palestinians for the war. In doing so, they present refugees as a continued threat to 
stability, and justify postwar discrimination intended to avert Palestinians naturalization. 
The preservation of a common scapegoat has been critical to sectarian unity following a 
devastating fifteen year war. No party in Lebanon, certainly not the Palestinians 
themselves, has advocated for tawteen. But as a potential sectarian threat to a Maronite 
dominated government, they face unrelenting harsh treatment and few opportunities. The 
lives of Palestinians in Lebanon are shaped not only by the historical events with which 
they are intertwined, but the way in which that history is remembered. 
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